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ADJUSTING TO THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION: THE
LAW OF CORPORATIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF
DELAWARE 1900-1941*
STEPHEN B. PRESSER**
RICHARD E. SIMPSON***
This Article is the third in a series on the federal courts in Penn-
sylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware. The collective title of the se-
ries, which eventually will be published as a book as part of the
Bicentennial, is Studies in the History of the Third Circuit. These
essays border on the picaresque and do not purport to be a defini-
tive history of the Third Circuit. The "Studies" simply attempt,
for each of the states in the Third Circuit, to explore a particular
problem in federal jurisprudence and to observe how the judges
rationalized their decisions. In this postrealiste age, it seems appro-
priate to take as a given that the judges often found themselves
choosing between conflicting or competing lines of authority, and
that this problem was most acute when our nation was in a period
of fundamental cultural upheaval. Accordingly, several periods of
* The research for this Article was done pursuant to a contract with the United States
Government. The right of the Government to republish this material is preserved, and no
claim to statutory copyright is established or asserted. As m the case of the two predecessors
of this Article, see notes 2 & 3 infra, the judges of the Third Circuit's Bicentennial
Committee, Chief Judge Collins J. Seitz, and Judges Albert B. Maris, George H. Barlow,
John J. Gibbons, and Edward Dumbauld read several drafts, corrected obvious errors, and
gave enthusiastic support. Thanks also are due to Dan Fischel, and to an anonymous
member of the Delaware bar, who read an early manuscript and who made helpful critical
suggestions. The staffs of the Morris Library of the Umversity of Delaware, of the
Eleutherian Mills Historical Association, and of the Delaware Historical Society gave
graciously of their time and resources to permit Professor Presser to learn about Judges
Bradford, Nields, and Morris, and the Wilmington News-Journal conducted a search of
their morgue to unearth some delightful pieces on Morris and Nields. Research assistance
was well provided by Gordon Hylton, Denison Hatch, Kenneth GoodSmith, Mitchell
Duneir, and Sherri Moremes. William Hillstrom wrote a semor research paper for Professor
Presser which brought to light several of the Delaware cases here discussed.
** Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
* Clerk to the Honorable Robert A. Sprecher, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, 1982-83.
1. Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 1980 Wis. L. REv. 1383.
725
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
such change in different Third Circuit states were picked for con-
sideration. First, the era following the ratification of the Constitu-
tion was selected. The resulting study thus concerned the earliest
federal judges, principally Richard Peters and Samuel Chase, and
how they responded to the changes in American society caused by
the American Revolution.2 In particular, the article that resulted
analyzed how the first federal judges of Pennsylvania confronted
the perceived necessity for altering legal institutions in accordance
with the dominant American political philosophy of popular sover-
eignty, and how the character of early American jurisprudence al-
lowed them freedom to implement their own conceptions of the
appropriate legal rules. The second study principally concerned
John Thompson Nixon, District Court Judge of New Jersey from
1870-1889, as he sought to respond to the increased litigation
caused by another "revolution," usually referred to as our "Indus-
trial Revolution," following the American Civil War.3
The subject of this Article, the third of the Studies, is the man-
ner in which the federal judges of Delaware and the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit dealt in the early twentieth century
with the continuing problems of American industrialization. The
focus of this Article is somewhat narrower than the others because
it is concerned simply with the doctrines of the law of corpora-
tions. As we shall see, however, it appears that the several judges
whose work is examined here responded to still a third "revolu-
tion," the "managerial revolution" in the American economy As
was true in the previous studies, this Article's primary interest is
in the choices which the judges made between conflicting doc-
trines. To place the legal doctrines in context, presented first is a
sketch of the importance of the corporation to the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century American economy, and of the atti-
tudes of its critics.4 This section is followed by some general com-
ments on the regulatory and facilitating activities of the New
Jersey and Delaware legislatures, whose activities also are neces-
sary to an understanding of the importance of the development of
2. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and The Broken Prom-
se of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 26 (1978).
3. Presser, Judicial Ajax: John Thompson Nixon and the Federal Courts of New Jersey
in the Late Nineteenth Century, 76 Nw. U.L. Rxv. 423 (1981).
4. On this point see also text accompanying notes 363-370 tnfra.
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law in the federal courts. A final matter to be explored before ex-
amining the decisions of the judges is the character of the "mana-
gerial revolution" itself, which may have ultimately determined the
climate in which the federal judges decided cases on corporate law.
The remainder of the article examines the backgrounds and judi-
cial opinions of the judges who sat on the bench of the United
States District Court for the District of Delaware during this pe-
riod, Judges Bradford, Morris, and Nields, and the disposition of
some of these cases on appeal to the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit. We are particularly concerned with the appeals re-
versed by, and the characteristics of, Circuit Judges Burlington and
Davis.
The thesis of the Article is that, although the Delaware federal
district court sought to respond to the managerial revolution by
striking a delicate balance between the need for managerial auton-
omy and for corporate democracy and legitimacy, the balance was
often upset on appeal, and tipped toward the needs of the corpo-
rate managers. A future study will examine how the somewhat
skewed nature of decisionmaking by the Third Circuit in the early
years of the twentieth century helped to determine the radically
different nature of the operation of the United States Court of Ap-
peals following still another revolution, the "Constitutional
Revolution" of 1937. .
TOWARD THE MODERN BusINEss CORPORATION
In the early nineteenth century, most economic activity was car-
ried on by single proprietors or by partnerships, while the use of
the corporate form was usually reserved for enterprises with a clear
public interest, such as specially chartered monopolies formed to
conduct charitable or transportation activities. By 1930, however,
ninety percent of all products manufactured in the United States
were made by corporations, and by 1950 most of the key industries
were dominated by large firms.5 Since the rise of the giant corpora-
tions, it frequently has been argued that the doctrines of corporate
law ought to be used as a means of holding corporate deci-
sionmakers accountable to the public, or at least to all sharehold-
5. D. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS: THE DEMocRAIC EXPERIENCE 420 (1973); A. CHANDLER,
THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN BusiNess 49 (1977).
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ers. These concerns were not absent during the formative period of
our law of corporations, the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries, but it appears that other purposes, such as the max-
imization of the autonomy of corporate managers, may have taken
priority.
The Managerial Revolution
As has recently been shown, a "managerial revolution" in Ameri-
can corporations came about because mass production rendered
many market mechanisms obsolete. A haphazard network of
wholesalers found it difficult to distribute the increased number of
manufactured goods. Supply often outran demand, and manufac-
turers began to recognize that market mechanisms too often
brought cutthroat competition and rapidly falling prices.' The
manufacturers eventually realized that, if mass production was to
provide an adequate return on investment, manufacturers would
have to remove both competitors and middlemen, and capture en-
tire markets. By the end of the nineteenth century, then, some
manufacturers had taken advantage of the new legal climate to ini-
tiate programs of vertical integration, setting up their own distri-
bution units and buying out the producers of raw materials. The
manufacturers were then in a position to buy out their competi-
tors, and this resulted in the most pervasive merger movement this
country has ever witnessed.7 By the turn of the century entire in-
dustries were controlled by a handful of giant firms, firms so large
that the original magnates and entrepreneurs could not operate
them alone. The manufacturers thus hired thousands of managers
to staff their vast and far-flung enterprises, and to create central
committees made up of department heads to formulate the broad
policies of the enterprise. According to Alfred D. Chandler, "By
then the visible hand of management replaced the invisible hand
of market forces in coordinating the flow from the suppliers of raw
materials to the ultimate consumers."8
As managers acquired control over the day-to-day allocation of
6. A Chandler, The Role of Business in the United States: A Historical Survey, in THE
AMERIcAN BUSINESS CORPORATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON PROFIT AND PURPOSE 39, 44 (1969).
7. Id. at 47.
8. A. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 315.
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goods in the economy, they acquired the knowledge and expertise
necessary to plan the efficient functioning of business, and accord-
ingly became more influential in corporate governance. By the late
nineteenth century, in the larger corporations, there was a notice-
ably increased separation between control and ownership.9 Eventu-
ally, with increasing levels of capitalization in the large corpora-
tions and the resultant diffusion of stock ownership, often no
stockholder or group of stockholders could obtain enough votes to
defeat management in a proxy fight.10 Stockholders at the corpora-
tions' annual meetings often simply ratified the decisions of the
board of directors and re-elected management's slate of directors.
Following World War II, even when the legal "owners" were
elected to the board of directors, "they [took] less and less part in
the running of the business. Management consider[ed] them 'out-
siders' and resent[ed] any interference from them.""
By the beginning of the twentieth century, several state and na-
tional institutions chose to facilitate the concentration of power in
management, thus establishing an enclave of corporate autonomy
free from governmental influence. Moreover, apparently the states'
liberalization of incorporation acts partially was designed to en-
hance the power of management and to restrict the authority of
stockholders.12 The Supreme Court's interpretation of the four-
teenth amendment to hold that a corporation is a "person" within
the meaning of that amendment and the Court's development of
substantive due process "substantially curbed the legitimacy of
government regulation of corporate behavior."1
The facilitation of corporate management was undertaken in an
9. P DRUCKER, THE NEW SoCIETY: THE ANATOMY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ORDER 34 (1949). See
also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, TaE MODERN CORPORATION AND PIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed.
1967).
10. In 1932, the largest stockholder in America's most powerful railroad (the Pennsylva-
ma Railroad) controlled 0.34% of the outstanding shares; the largest stockholder in the
number one utility (American Telephone & Telegraph Company) controlled 0.7%, and the
largest stockholder in the number one industrial company (United States Steel Corporation)
controlled 0.9%. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 9, at 47.
11. P DRUCKER, supra note 9, at 34.
12. Rutledge, Significant Trends in Modern Incorporation Statutes, 22 WASH. U.L.Q.
305, 312 (1937). Rutledge laments that "the individual stockholder has been placed almost
m the position of holding a 'pig-m-a-poke."' Id.
13. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAw OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1780-1970, at 66 (1970).
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atmosphere in which altruism was still present. Government offi-
cials recognized the advantages of corporate autonomy to the pro-
ductive capacity of the country By the turn of the century, corpo-
rations were turning out sixty-six percent of the United States'
manufactured output, and this figure rose to eighty-seven percent
by 1920.14 According to Hurst, "[N]o social goal was dearer to the
late-nineteenth-century United States than increase of economic
productivity [,and]. the corporation. emerged as the princi-
pal instrument for organizing large business enterprise." 15
Delaware-The New Home of Corporatins
The modern corporation probably first flourished under the New
Jersey Incorporation Act of 1896,11 but its greatest friend was to be
the legislature of the state of Delaware.1 7 Both Delaware and New
Jersey adopted a policy of minimum regulation of corporations,
and firms were soon flocking to those states to incorporate. As a
result, federal judges in the district of Delaware were to play an
important role in the development of the modern corporation.
With many interstate disputes arising from the widespread activi-
ties and policies of Delaware corporations, the federal courts' atti-
tudes toward the corporate scheme created by the Delaware legis-
lature in large part determined whether the legislative intent
respecting corporations would be implemented. Before studying
the activities of the federal courts, however, it is important to un-
derstand the nature of the legislative schemes which the courts
were called upon to interpret.
THE LEGISLATURES AND THE CORPORATIONS
In the late nineteenth century, especially in transportation and
manufacturing, corporations and "trusts" rapidly became the pre-
dominant form of economic organization, and often were able to
drive smaller enterprises out of the market. Combinations, acquisi-
tions, and mergers often allowed firms to take advantage of econo-
14. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 9, at 40 n.21.
15. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 68.
16. 1896 N.J. Laws ch. 185.
17. See, e.g., Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE
L.J. 663 (1974).
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mies of scale and lower prices to a point that made operation by
smaller firms unprofitable. Some industrial magnates of this era
accumulated fabulous wealth, occasionally enough to extend loans
to the federal government.1 8
In. the early years of this period, however, most corporations
were subject to state regulation which limited capital stock and al-
lowed for continual judicial interference in corporate affairs. In
Delaware, for example, an 1871 statute fixed maximum and mini-
mum levels of capital stock at $100,000 and $10,000, respectively."
Such limitations on levels of capital stock meant that no legal
means existed by which corporations could merge into giant firms
capable of dominating entire industries. Further, states also re-
quired corporations to adhere closely to 'the business purposes set
forth in their charters, thereby preventing corporate diversification
and vertical integration.20 Finally, the states did not allow corpora-
tions to amend the scheme of shareholder democracy mandated
both by common law and by corporate charters, so that to the ex-
tent that democratic processes slowed decisionmaking, corpora-
tions were not necessarily readily adaptable to changing economic
circumstances.21
Seeking the economic benefits of large-scale operation,22 entre-
preneurs such as John D. Rockefeller first attempted to circumvent
state regulation of corporations by concentrating capital in unin-
corporated "trusts." This scheme developed by the ingenious attor-
ney Samuel C.T Dodd in 1879 for Rockefeller's Standard Oil Com-
pany,23 was an arrangement in which several corporations put their
properties under the control of a group of trustees who then oper-
ated the enterprises in concert.24 The trust avoided the pitfalls of
corporate law, but the arrangement had weaknesses. If a number of
18. Indeed, some observers believed that at least one enterprise, J.P Morgan & Company,
was profiteering more than lending. In any event, Morgan's banking group controlled
enough capital to obtain half the gold m Europe In 1895. H. FAULKNER, PoLIrxcs, REFORM
AND EXPANSION 155, 156 (1959).
19. 14 Del. Laws ch. 152 (1871).
20. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 9, at 122.
21. See id. at 123-24.
22. See D. BooRsTnN, supra note 5, at 416.
23. Id. at 417.
24. Id. at 416; T. MANNING, THE STANDARD OIL CoMPANY. THE RISE OF A NATIONAL MO-
NOPOLY 16 (1960).
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corporations in the trust disagreed with the majority, they could
leave the trust, causing a renewal of costly competition. Further,
the trust device was endangered in 1890 when Congress passed the
Sherman Antitrust Act.
Perceiving an opportunity for state gain, the New Jersey legisla-
ture soon came to the rescue by enacting a series of new corpora-
tion statutes. These laws permitted unlimited capitalization and
encouraged holding companies. The laws eliminated or greatly lib-
eralized earlier laws that imposed limits on corporate purpose and
duration. Finally, by 1896, the revised New Jersey incorporation
act's "self-determination clause" permitted corporations to amend
their charters to modify, regulate, or create corporate powers, so
long as these amendments were not contrary to other provisions of
state law.25 In short, these revisions "turned corporate law inside
out" by changing the long-standing rule that corporations could
exercise only those powers expressly granted by the legislature.26
Many enterprises soon relocated in New Jersey, and incorpora-
tion fees began to supply a large part of government revenue. By
1902 New Jersey was able to abolish its property taxes, and by
1905 it had a three million dollar surplus in its treasury 7 Across
the state line, Delaware was growing "gangrened with envy at the
spectacle of the truck-patchers, sand-duners, and mosquito wafters
of New Jersey getting all the money in the country into her cof-
fers."'28 Thus, in 1899 Delaware enacted its own liberal incorpora-
tion statute modeled on New Jersey's incorporation act.29
25. Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, DML. J.
CORP. L. 249, 261 (1976). The New Jersey incorporation statutes did not expressly legalize
holding companies. Rather, the provision allowing corporations to hold the stock of other
corporations was held to be broad enough to include the creation of holding companies.
Samuel C.T. Dodd devised the holding company as a form of economic organization when
the Standard Oil Trust was held to be illegal. See D. BOORSTIN, supra note 5, at 419.
26. Seligman, supra note 25, at 264.
27. Id. at 268.
28. Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of Trusts, 33 Am. L. REv. 418, 419
(1899).
29. For example, Delaware's "self-determination clause" provided that:
The Certificate of Incorporation may contain any provision which the in-
corporators may choose to insert for the management of the business and for
the conduct of the affairs of the corporation, and any provisions creating, de-
fining, limiting and regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and
the stockholders, or any class of the stockholders ., provided, such provi-
[Vol. 23:725732
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Even though Delaware sought to take advantage of market com-
petition by charging a lower incorporation fee, Delaware's statutes
initially attracted few corporations to the state. This lack of suc-
cess probably was because potential incorporators were suspicious
of what appeared to be Delaware's sudden "camp-meeting" con-
version, and thus decided not to leave states where corporate pol-
icy had become stable.30 This trend changed in 1913 when New
Jersey's Governor Woodrow Wilson destroyed that state's popular-
ity among incorporators by encouraging the enactment of laws de-
cidedly unfavorable to corporate autonomy. Corporate regulation
was a part of Wilson's general reform program which was directed
at everything from public utilities to high food prices.3 1 Governor
Wilson's attempts to circumscribe corporations reflected a still
widespread hostility toward corporations in particular and the con-
centration of economic power in general. In his inaugural address,
for example, Wilson promised to enact legislation that would "pre-
vent the abuse of the privilege of incorporation which has in recent
years brought so much discredit upon our State." Legislation was
necessary, Wilson believed, "to prescribe methods by which the
public shall be safeguarded against fraud, deception, extortion, and
every abuse of its confidence. ' 2 Wilson reasoned that corporate
regulation was necessary to protect both small stockholders and
the public from exploitation by corporate managers and others
who had been "preying upon them."3 3
As New Jersey seemed to perform a complete reversal to de-
mand greater corporate responsibility, Delaware became "the
happy hunting ground of the corporate promoter."' Considerable
advantages accrued to Delaware from this situation. The revenue
generated by the state's incorporating fees significantly eased the
tax burden on its citizens, and from 1913 to 1934 franchise taxes
sions are not contrary to the laws of this State.
Del. Corporation Law art. 1, § 4 (1928).
30. Stoke, Economic Influence Upon the Corporation Laws of New Jersey, 38 J. POL.
ECON. 551, 576 (1930).
31. D. LociKARD, THE NEW JERSEY GOVERNOR: A STUDY IN POLITICAL POWER 108 (1964).
32. See Woodrow Wilson's Inaugural Speech, quoted in D. HmST, WOODROW WILSON: RE-
FORM GOVERNOR 168, 169 (1965).
33. Id. at 163.
34. Dodd, Statutory Developments in Business Corporation Law, 1886-1936, 50 HARv. L.
REV. 27, 27 (1936).
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and related fees contributed an average of twenty-five percent of
Delaware's total state revenues.3 5 Accordingly, from time to time
the Delaware legislature further amended its incorporation stat-
utes to facilitate corporate formation and to enlarge the range of
corporate autonomy 36 It is generally concluded that, under the
new Delaware corporation laws, ideas of corporate democracy were
of secondary importance, as "the various amendments of the Dela-
ware Act tended to concentrate in the board of directors the
exercise of powers which had heretofore required ratification by
the stockholders. '3 7
THE DELAWARE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT: WORKING TOWARD THE
BALANCE
During the first forty years of the twentieth century the Dela-
ware federal district court was confronted with the first important
series of corporate law cases which followed both the managerial
revolution and Delaware's liberal incorporation statutes. Appar-
ently eager to please both stockholders and corporate management,
the Delaware federal court struck a delicate balance between cor-
porate democracy and managerial autonomy.
The Judges
Court opinions often reflect, in varying degrees, the personal at-
titudes and preferences of the presiding judge. With this observa-
tion in mind, it is useful briefly to trace the backgrounds of the
three Delaware federal district judges who sat during the first forty
years of the twentieth century, emphasizing their association with,
and opinions on, corporations and corporate officers.
1. Edward G. Bradford, Jr
Edward G. Bradford, Jr. served as a federal district judge in Del-
aware from 1897 to 1918. Judge Bradford, through his marriage to
Eleuthora Du Pont, was connected with the Du Ponts, the richest
35. Seligman, supra note 25, at 276.
36. See, e.g., Berle, Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L.
REv. 563, 563 (1929).
37. R. LAcoM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 154 (1937).
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and most powerful family in Delaware, and the owners of E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Company, one of the leading manufacturing
firms in the country.
A state historian wrote that Bradford was "of a studious disposi-
tion," 8 and John P Nields, eulogizing Bradford in 1928, said that
Bradford's moral indignation often reached the intensity of the
"fire of Savanarola."39 Bradford had acted on his beliefs at the
state constitutional convention in 1897 where he advocated mea-
sures to prevent corruption and bribery at elections. 0
2. Hugh M. Morrs
Hugh M. Morris, who succeeded Bradford, sat as federal district
judge from 1918 to 1930. Before his appointment, Morris carried
on "an excellent and lucrative"' 1 corporate practice with Willard
Saulsbury, Delaware's United States Senator. Morris was a vice
president of the Equitable Trust Company of Wilmington and a
trustee of the Wilmington Trust Company. In addition, he was a
director of the Delaware Power Company, the Delaware Light &
Power Company, and the Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington
Railroad Company.'2
Morris was born in Delaware, 43 was a Son of the American
Revolution, a leader in Delaware's Americanization movement,44
38. W BEVAN & E. WILLIMS, HISTORY OF DELAWARw : PAST AND PRESNTv 367 (1929).
39. Id. For an example of the Savanarola-like fire that blazed within Judge Bradford, see
his letter to Francis G. Du Pont in which the judge describes his reaction to a "thoroughly
bad man" as being "disgusted beyond measure." The man in question appears to have been
a church official who allegedly committed "gross unusualities," and had "improper relations
with a young woman." The Judge recommended to Du Pont that he "drop him instantly."
Letter from Judge Bradford to Francis G. Du Pont (Nov. 14, 1893) (Accession 504, Box 21,
Family Correspondence of Francis G. Du Pont, Eleutherian Mills Historical Society, Wil-
mington, Delaware.)
40. W B.vAN & E. WiLLIA Ms, supra note 38, at 367.
41. Id. at 88.
42. CHASE, KRISLov, BOYUM, & CLARK, BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF THE FEDERAL JUDICI-
ARY (1976).
43. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1923, § 7, at 10, col. 8.
44. See Id. Morris's concern for Americanization, however, was prompted in part by a fear
of class warfare. In 1923 Morris told a group of naturalized citizens:
Every American citizen should have in his home a copy of the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution. Unless you and all other American
citizens understand the principles of the Government you now have, it will be
easy for visionaries, demagogues and those tirelessly scheming to destroy all
1982]
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and a member of the Democratic party. Indeed, even while he was
on the bench, he may have been advising the Chairman of the
Democratic party on how to deal with the influence of the Republi-
can Du Ponts in Delaware. In a letter dated October 22, 1920, ap-
parently written by Judge Morris, he indicates that, "The worship
of the Golden Calf in this community has gone to such an extent
that the atmosphere reeks of the yellow rich." The letter acknowl-
edges that Pierre S. Du Pont "is reputed to be a very good man,"
but that "[h]e is a sample of the very rich men who think that in
some way the Almighty has made him [sic] a trustee of wealth and
that his [sic] ideas regarding its management and disposition are
infallible." Judge Morris laments in the letter that Pierre "is, of
course, surrounded completely by a lot of boot licks praising his
greatness, his generosity and infallibility." '45
3. John P Nields
John P Nields was appointed by President Hoover to replace
Judge Morris in 1930 and sat on the federal bench until 1941. In
contrast to the private beliefs of Judge Morris, Judge Nields, who
appears to have been Pierre S. Du Pont's lawyer in connection
with certain of Du Pont's charitable endeavors,46 was convinced
that Pierre was a "remarkable" man who was engaged in a "holy
experiment" designed to better the education and the material
well-being of the citizens of Delaware in a manner "so near the
ideal that few can believe it today.' '47 Nields thought that the con-
tribution of the Du Pont Company to the Allied Armies in World
War I, made possible by the company's "manufacturing experience
and . well-trained organization," was the most "outstanding
achievement" in Delaware history during the period from 1876 to
1926. Nields appears to have shared in the sentiment of Lord
government to induce you to exchange those principles for principles which
deny to man the rights of life, liberty, property and the pursuit of happiness.
Id. col. 4.
45. A copy of the letter to the Honorable George White, Chairman of the Democratic
Committee, is among Judge Moms's papers in the Morris Library's Special Collection, Uni-
versity of Delaware, Newark. The copy is not signed by Morris, but appears to be typed by
the same machine that was used for his other correspondence.
46. See N.Y. Times, July 1, 1930, § 1, at 4.
47. J. Nields, September Twentieth: Delaware's Birthday 14-15 (September 20, 1926).
[Vol. 23:725
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
Moulton, who gave the Du Pont Company, J.P. Morgan & Com-
pany, and the Bethlehem Steel Company the credit for enabling
the British and French armies to "hold their own" during the
War.4"
Nields appears to have been on close personal terms with the
son of the leader of the corporate bar, Josiah Marvel.49 Nields also
apparently traveled in rather aristocratic Delaware Republican and
Episcopalian circles.50 Nonetheless, Nields appears to have been
greatly influenced by the career of Theodore Roosevelt and to have
embraced what Nields perceived to be Roosevelt's commitment to
"ideas of social and industrial justice. 5 1 Nields noted that, when
Roosevelt took over for the assassinated McKinley, Roosevelt was
nothing less than "a hero [responding to] an Olympian summons,"
and subscribed to Roosevelt's opinion that "[t]he surest way to in-
vite disaster is to be rich, aggressive, and unprepared. '52 Yet
Nields recognized that, after 1900, Americans clearly had decided
against the notion "that the laissez faire doctrine should control
legislators in dealing with vast corporate wealth and influence. '53
Judge Nields's attitude toward the South reveals a similar di-
chotomy in his beliefs. He appears to have believed that the Civil
War was badly misnamed because that conflict was in reality "an
attempt by the North, the stronger of two separate nations," to
"attack, conquer and re-annex the weaker. ' ' 4 Even if the North
was the aggressor against the weaker South, however, Nields be-
lieved that at least one of the South's postwar responses to build
its social system, the Ku Klux Klan, was an "abommation of
abominations. 5 Judge Nields's judicial treatment of the law of
corporations and that of his brother district court judges show a
48. Id. at 8-9.
49. Josiah Marvel, Jr., was a member of the committee m charge of organizing Judge
Nields's retirement ceremony in 1941. Proceedings m the District Court of the United
States for the District of Delaware on September 30, 1941, in Connection with the Retire-
ment of the Honorable John P Nields 3 (1941).
50. CHASE, KRiSLov, BoYUM & CLARK, supra note 42.
51. Address by John P Nields (Oct. 27, 1923) (Old Town Hall Leaflets, No. 1).
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Address by John P Nields (May 23, 1929) (given before Wilmington Rotary Club and
Veterans of the Civil War, who were guests at the club).
55. Address by John P Nields (Oct. 2, 1925) (given before Delaware Bar Association).
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similar recognition of dichotomies and an attempt to achieve
moderation.
The Bradford Period: Creating the Balance
1. Jones v Mutual Fidelity
Edward Bradford may have been the first modern Delaware fed-
eral court judge to seek to strike a balance between managerial au-
tonomy and corporate democracy Judge Bradford sought to create
this balance in the context of cases involving corporate abuse of
power. Perhaps the best example of Bradford's attitude toward
corporate abuses comes in Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co.56 The de-
fendant was a Delaware corporation which had sold "certificates of
investment" to the plaintiffs, Tennessee residents. The certificates
were vaguely worded, so that the investors actually were promised
nothing by the Delaware corporation.57 Bradford was convinced
that the certificates were "ambiguous, misleading and obscure, and
so artfully worded as to prove a snare to the ignorant and unwary,"
that the defendant had engaged in "fraudulent representation,"
and that the defendant hatched a "disreputable and overreaching
scheme" accomplished by "deception and illegitimate means"
which held out the promise of "well-nigh impossible profits." 8
There were two technical arguments, however, which Bradford
could have used to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims. First, none of the
individual plaintiffs had claims which were large enought to meet
the $2000 requirement for federal diversity jurisdiction, 59 although
the aggregate of their claims was greater than $2000. Second, the
equitable remedy which the plaintiffs sought, namely placing the
insolvent defendant in receivership and ordering a pro rata distri-
bution of defendant's assets to its creditors, including the plain-
tiffs, 0 although provided for in a Delaware statute by application
to the Delaware Chancellor,"' was not expressly authorized by any
state or federal statute as a proceeding in the federal courts.
56. 123 F 506 (D. Del. 1903).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 531.
59. Id. at 510.
60. Id. at 510, 512.
61. Id. at 511.
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Bradford disposed of the jurisdictional amount issue by stating
that the test for jurisdictional amount was not the plaintiffs' indi-
vidual claims but the amount of corporate assets that would be
placed in receivership if the plaintiffs succeeded. 2 There appears
to be some lower federal court authority which supported Judge
Bradford, but there also appears to be several United States Su-
preme Court decisions which suggest that Judge Bradford's
method of calculation of jurisdictional amount was too liberal.2 3
The second issue, Whether the federal court could apply the
state equitable receivership statute, was a more difficult hurdle for
Judge Bradford because the Supreme Court had explicitly stated
in Hollins v. Bnerfield Coal & Iron Co. that when the plaintiffs
were unsecured creditors whose claims had not been reduced to
judgment (as was the case in Jones):
It is the settled law of this court that such creditors cannot come
into a court of equity to obtain the seizure of the property of
their debtor, and its application to the satisfaction of their
claims; and this, notwithstanding a statute of the state may au-
thorize such a proceeding in the courts of the state. The line of
demarcation between equitable and legal remedies in the Fed-
eral courts cannot be obliterated by state legislation.'
Bradford dismissed this language, and perhaps the policy of strict
construction of federal jurisdiction, with the observation that it
was "mere obiter dictum. 65 Although Judge Bradford was reluc-
tant to disagree with the clear language of the Supreme Court, he
concluded that it would be an "absurdity"6 to apply the Supreme
Court's rule when refusing the parties equitable relief in the fed-
eral court "would defeat and practically nullify the equitable right
created by [the state] statute. 6 7 Judge Bradford chose to reject
the Supreme Court's reasoning, and instead relied on broad prmci-
62. Id. at 512-14.
63. Compare, e.g., Wheless v. St. Lous, 180 U.S. 379 (1901) (Bradford's calculation too
liberal) with Taylor v. Decator Mineral & Land Co. 112 F 449 (N.D. Ala. 1901) (Bradford's
calculation correct).
64. Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 371 (1893), quoted tn Jones v. Mutual
Fidelity Co., 123 F at 525.
65. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 F at 525.
66. Id. at 527.
67. Id.
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ples such as "a party by going into a national court does not lose
any right or appropriate remedy of which he might have availed
himself in the state courts,' '6 and "justice and positive rights,
founded both on valid statutes and valid contracts, should not be
sacrificed to mere questions of mode and form." 9
Perhaps the most impressive judicial legerdemain in Bradford's
opinion, however, was in the final few paragraphs where he turned
a case of fraud,7 0 which the plaintiffs might have had difficulty
proving, into a case "on the common count in assumpsit for money
had and received, '7 1 for which the standard of proof probably
could be met simply by the plaintiffs' entering their certificates of
investment into evidence. Specifically, Bradford observed that,
under Tennessee law, a foreign corporation seeking to do business
in the state was required to file a copy of its charter with the Ten-
nessee secretary of state, and that failure to file the charter made
it "unlawful for any foreign corporation to do business in the
state.17 2 The defendant never had made the requisite filing.73 This
meant, Bradford held, that the transaction by which the "certifi-
cates of investment" were sold to the plaintiffs was "unlawful.
7 4
Thus, the plaintiffs, who Bradford without explanation said "were
not chargeable with knowledge of the fact that the defendant had
failed to comply with the requirements of the Tennessee statute,"
were "innocent parties to unlawful and void contracts. '75 Despite
the fact that the plaintiffs hardly could be called "innocent" in
that they sought "impossible profits,"761 Bradford declared that
they were entitled to be treated as creditors and recover from the
defendant "all moneys paid by them to it on account of the pro-
hibited contracts. '7 7 Bradford cited a Supreme Court opinion and
a treatise that mandated such treatment for "innocent" parties
68. Id. at 517.
69. Id. at 523 (quoting Brine v. Insurance Co., 96 U.S. 627, 634 (1877)).
70. Id. at 531.
71. Id. at 533.
72. 1891 Tenn. Pub. Acts, p. 264, ch. 122.
73. Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 F at 531.
74. Id. at 532.
75. Id. at 533.
76. Id. at 531.
77. Id. at 533.
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who had lost money under illegal contracts, 7  but, other than
pointing out the plaintiffs' gullibility, avarice, and ignorance of the
Tennessee statute, Bradford offered no explanation of their
innocence.7 9
In Jones, Bradford apparently refused to follow relevant federal
precedent, judicially expanded the boundaries of federal jurisdic-
tion, and used Tennessee state law as a pretext for granting relief
where he believed a Delaware corporation had defrauded investors.
Decisions such as Jones, Bradford might reasonably have believed,
would tend to assure the public that the federal judiciary would
take all means at its disposal to ensure that corporations con-
ducted their activities in a manner consistent not only with the
law, but also with basic principles of fairness.
Similar indications of Judge Bradford's vigilant willingness to
act in cases of "fraudulent representation," "disreputable
schemes," or "deception"80 occur in several other corporations
cases. It appears, however, that Bradford generally required sub-
stantial evidence of wrongdoing before he concluded that the of-
ficers of a corporation were liable for their conduct.
2. Wright, Beltz, and Sellman
In Wright v. Barnard,81 a case decided near the end of Judge
Bradford's term, Wright, the complainant and general manager of
the company,81 sued the company's vice president and secretary-
treasurer for fraud and breach of contract. s Wright alleged that
the defendants, who actually held only a minority of the company's
stock,84 falsely represented that they owned all of the stock" and
that they would increase the amount of stock and give Wright one-
third stock ownership in the company if he would continue suc-
cessfully to manage the company's business. 8 The officers of the
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 531.
81. 248 F 756 (D. Del. 1917).
82. See id. at 759.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See zd. at 760-63. The officers' primary concern was that Wright would largely in-
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company, while taking advantage of Wright's services,87 had fraud-
ulently failed to carry out their promises to see that the company
was reorganized in a manner which would permit Wright to own
shares.8
In holding the company liable for the misconduct of its officers,
Bradford was careful to note that "[iut is difficult to conceive of a
case more permeated with fraud than that now before this
court."8 Bradford further stated that "[t]he evidence has es-
tablished to a moral certainty fraud and wrongdoing "90 In
addition, by holding the company liable, Judge Bradford actually
was rewarding one who had demonstrated an ability and desire dil-
igently to exercise managerial skill.9 1 Normally, limiting the liabil-
ity of a corporation and its officers in cases of managerial discre-
tion resulted in encouraging that discretion; but where, as here, the
primary manager of the company was the one who sought compen-
sation for fraud, and where the evidence seemed clear, it was easy
to strike the balance in a manner that afforded the manager relief.
One other case in the last year of Judge Bradford's service un-
derscores his commitment to facilitating the development of corpo-
rate enterprise through the protection of productive individuals,
even if it meant subjecting others in the corporation to liability. In
Beltz v. Great Western Lead Manufacturing Co.,9 2 Judge Brad-
ford was presented with another case involving a manager, this
time a mining superintendent, John Beltz, who sought relief
against the corporation for which he had served. Apparently no
fraud was involved,93 but several corporate associates failed to
honor a contractual promise to deliver one-fifth of the capital stock
of the corporation in return for the complainant's delivery of all
crease the sales of the business. Id. at 760.
87. Id. at 767. "[N]otwithstanding default on the part of [the officers], the complain-
ant, who was wholly unaware of the falsity of their statements as to stock ownership and
control, continued actively and loyally to co-operate with them for the advancement of the
company's business and welfare." Id.
88. Id. at 766.
89. Id. at 772.
90. Id.
91. See text accompanying notes 84-88 supra.
92. 251 F 696 (D. Del. 1918).
93. The action was based on breach of contract. See id. at 697-98.
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the capital stock in a predecessor corporation."4 The complainant
invested considerable time and money m the old corporation,
bringing a deposit of ore nearly to the stage where it would yield
profitable results.95 The complainant, the court observed, was a
man "of but little education,"96 suggesting that this might account
for the "inconsistences and discrepancies on minor points"9 in his
testimony Taking account of how the individual defendants actu-
ally had allowed many others to profit from the initial success of
the company, 8 and how poorly the complainant fared at the hands
of the new corporation, 9 Bradford declared:
[I]t is against the dictates of self-interest and the known rules of
human conduct that after acquiring the mining lease and turn-
ing it over to the [new] company in consideration of which its
total capital stock was issued, he should. . have intended or
contemplated that [the stock] would be so manipulated as to
produce the grotesque result the defendants seek to justify.100
The new corporation m the meantime had gone into bankruptcy,101
but Bradford proceeded to hold four individual defendants, who
had been the founders of the new corporation along with the com-
plainant, personally liable for their failure to deliver stock to the
complainant according to the agreement. 102 Bradford gave the
complainant the benefit of the doubt m resolving some inconsis-
tencies in the testimony,103 and it seems likely, given his expressed
94. Id. The corporate name remained the same, but the scope of corporate activities
expanded.
95. Id. at 697.
96. Id. at 706.
97. Id.
98. See id. The court observed that the complainant "received by way of dividends only
$950 as against $8,942.50, received by each of the other parties to the agreement." Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 707.
102. Id.
103. For example, when Beltz delivered all of the stock to the treasurer of the company, it
was unclear why he delivered the stock for cancellation, which reduced the capital stock of
the company from $500,000 to $10,000. Judge Bradford observed that, "it appears that the
stock was reduced from the larger to the smaller sum m order to avoid the payment of an
undue amount of tax, but not for the purpose of altering the proportionate interests of [the
corporate associates] and Beltz m the capital stock of the company." Id. at 702.
Similarly, the defendants contended that, because Beltz paid only $475 under the provi-
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views in the two cases considered earlier, that the initiative and
expense undertaken by the complainant as a manager for the com-
pany, as well as the defendants' breach of contract, played a role in
his decision.
Other Bradford judicial opinions indicate, however, that he was
less inclined to grant relief in the case of nonmanagerial sharehold-
ers, or of creditors who sought relief against corporate officials,
when there was no clear and convincing proof of fraud or decep-
tion. In Sellman v. German Union Fire Insurance Co., 04 for exam-
ple, Judge Bradford was asked, in his role as an equity judge, to
appoint a receiver for a corporation, and to direct the receiver to
wind up the corporation's affairs, distribute assets, and restrain the
defendant's officers from interfering with the granting of relief.10 5
The plaintiffs were several stockholders and creditors of the com-
pany 06 who asked for relief on the grounds that the company's
board of directors, through "various misrepresentations and
fraudulent acts and purposes,' 10 7 had so disregarded the rights of
the stockholders and creditors as to bring "such peril to the corpo-
ration"'10 8 that the drastic relief they called for was necessary
Bradford observed that there were "many authorities" which
stated that, "where the facts clearly disclose such fraudulent or
wrongful management of its business and affairs as to produce a
conviction that further control of the corporation by its board
would result in the destruction of its business or create a great and
unnecessary loss to its creditors and stockholders," relief of the
sions of the contract, he was entitled to no further credits on his stock subscription. Id. at
703. Although the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas in an earlier decision on a collat-
eral issue had found that Beltz paid only $475, Bradford ruled that the court of common
pleas' finding was "made under circumstances which deprive it of any binding effect upon
the complainant, and further, was clearly erroneous." Id. Beltz, arguing that he had paid the
full amount under the contract, contended that his $125 per month salary was applied
against his monthly obligations. Id. at 704. The president of the company denied that such
an arrangement was made with Beltz. Bradford, after considering some rather ambiguous
statements which he thought corroborated Beltz's argument, stated that, "the complainant's
statement on this subject is natural and inherently probable." Id.
104. 184 F 977 (D. Del. 1909).
105. Id. at 978.
106. Id. at 977.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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sort sought by the plaintiffs might be granted.109
In Seliman, however, Bradford refused to grant the requested
relief.110 Bradford reasoned that "the stockholders are by no means
unanimous on the question of the wisdom or propriety of the relief
sought by the bill," '' and "in the case of a corporation which is a
solvent and going concern the proofs must be clear and convincing
to justify the winding up of its business and affairs. 1" 2 Statmg
what seems to have been the assumption of Delaware law that a
strong presumption of legitimacy was to be accorded by Delaware
law to the acts of managers, or at least to the board of directors of
corporations, Bradford observed:
[T]he board of directors of a corporation is charged by law with
the control of its business and affairs; and when the law making
power has declared that the business and affairs of a corpora-
tion, created and organized under that power, shall be directed
by its board, it ill-becomes courts created for the admnistration
of law, unless under special and peculiar circumstances, to de-
clare that its business and affairs shall not be directed by such a
board.113
Thus, although Bradford intervened in corporate affairs, he at-
tempted to balance any inclination to intervene by an attentive-
ness to the policies which he could discern behind the Delaware
Incorporation Act, policies which dictated a maximum of auton-
omy for the managers of corporations. When obvious wrongdoing
compelled Bradford to act, however, as the Jones and Beltz cases
demonstrate, he was somehow able to brush aside conflicting legal
doctrines and dispel doubts about evidence in a manner which sat-
109. Id. at 978.
110. Id. at 979.
111. Id. at 978.
112. Id.
113. Id. See Carson v. Allegany Window Glass Co., 189 F. 791 (D. Del. 1911), in which
Bradford denied relief similar to that sought in Sellman. In Carson, Bradford noted that he
might grant a receivership in favor of stockholder complainants who alleged that the mis-
management and misrepresentations of corporate officers were injurious to the financial
soundness, good will, and credit of a corporation if "strong and clear proof" were made that
"fraudulent, wilful, or reckless mismanagement" threatened to destroy the business. Where
there are differences of opinion among the stockholders, or where no other stockholders
beside the complainant come forward to join in the prayer for relief, however, Bradford
declared that the "strong and clear proof" standard cannot be met.
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isfied his conscience.
3. Du Pont v Du Pont
Perhaps the most important corporations case decided by the
Delaware federal district court during the early twentieth century
was Du Pont v. Du Pont."" The Du Pont litigation arose during
Judge Bradford's term, but Judge J. Whitaker Thompson of the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia decided Du Pont because Bradford had connections by mar-
riage to both sides in the dispute.
Although Judge Thompson was not a "permanent" Delaware
federal district judge, and this article is primarily concerned with
the "permanent" judges, the Du Pont case still merits serious con-
sideration for several reasons. First, developments at Du Pont, a
Delaware corporation, were crucial in the development of the mod-
ern corporation. 15 Second, the views articulated by Thompson in
the Du Pont decision bear a strong resemblance to Judge Brad-
ford's views in similar corporations cases. Further, the reaction of
the court of appeals to Thompson's Du Pont opinion appears to be
of a piece with the court of appeals' treatment of several other
opinions by the "permanent" Delaware federal district judges." 6
Du Pont concerned the efforts of Pierre S. Du Pont to assume
control of E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company and to diminish
the influence of his cousins, Alfred and William. This controversy
was one of the most important events in the career of Pierre S. Du
Pont, as he began to develop his plans to transform Du Pont from
a relatively small gunpowder company into one of the world's great
industrial giants. Pierre was a pioneer in the emerging business
arts of vertical integration and financial management, and his ef-
forts on behalf of Du Pont were profoundly important in bringing
114. 234 F 459 (D. Del. 1916); 242 F 98 (D. Del. 1917); 251 F 937 (D. Del. 1918), modi-
fied, 256 F 129 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919). The first opinion is an interlocu-
tory decree by Judge Thompson; the second and third opinions are decisions on the merits
of the case.
115. For evaluations of the importance of the activities of Pierre S. Du Pont and the Du
Pont company to the development of the modern corporation, see A. CHANDLER & S. SALS-
BURY, PIERRE S. Du PONT AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN CORPORATION (1971), and A.
CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 438-50.
116. See text accompanying notes 318-362 infra.
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about the "managerial revolution" which ensured the hegemony of
American business in the mid-twentieth century '1
a. Background
The Du Pont litigation arose because of the manner in which
Pierre S. Du Pont acquired control of the company. The key act by
Pierre was the formation of a holding company and the purchase
of 63,000 shares of Du Pont stock from Pierre's cousin, T. Coleman
Du Pont.118 This stock was the largest single block of stock in the
company 119 The next two largest holdings had been those of Pierre
himself, and of another cousin, Alfred Du Pont.120 Before the hold-
ing company's purchase of Coleman's shares, Pierre, Alfred and
Coleman had held the company's highest executive positions.1 21 In
late 1914, however, Coleman was in need of liquid assets to enable
him to purchase New York real estate and to pursue political am-
bitions. Accordingly, he offered to sell 20,700 shares of his common
stock to the company at a price of $160 per share.122 When com-
municating his offer to Pierre, who then was acting for the com-
pany, Coleman stated that he believed the stock to be worth at
least $200 per share because of the profits the company could ex-
pect to reap from gunpowder sales to the Allied nations then fight-
ing in the World War.1 23 The apparent generosity of Coleman's of-
fer, in light of the value he placed on the stock, was a result of his
expectation that the stock would be resold by the company under
favorable terms to some of the company's junior executives.124 The
activities of these young executives already had resulted in great
profit to Coleman and the other Du Ponts, and he felt them de-
serving of this consideration.1 25
Pierre relayed Coleman's offer to the company's finance commit-
117. See sources cited m note 115 supra.
118. See Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F 98, 101 (D. Del. 1917).
119. See zd.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 103.
124. Id. at 101, 103-04.
125. Id. at 103,04.
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tee,128 which then included Pierre, Alfred, and still another cousin,
William Du Pont.127 Alfred appears to have been more pessimistic
about the company's immediate prospects than was Coleman, 28
and while Alfred believed that the purchase for resale to the execu-
tives was a sound plan, he believed that a counteroffer should be
made to Coleman of $125 per share. 29 When the finance commit-
tee voted whether to accept Coleman's offer, William sided with
Alfred.130 Pierre voted to accept Coleman's $160 offer.131 Thus, the
majority of the committee present had voted not to accept the of-
fer from Coleman. According to Alfred's and William's testimony
at trial, however, the finance committee understood that Pierre
would continue price negotiations with Coleman.1 3 2 Nevertheless,
the minutes of the finance committee, signed by all parties, simply
stated that Pierre was directed to inform Coleman that "we do not
feel justified in paying more than $125 per share for this stock." 133
Six days later, the report of the finance committee presented to
the company's board of directors stated that "[t]he committee ex-
pressed the feeling that we are not justified in paying more than
$125 per share for that stock and asked Mr P.S. du Pont to take
the matter up with Mr T C. du Pont further " ' 3 The evidence on
whether Pierre was expected to continue to act on behalf of the
finance committee once he had communicated the finance commit-
tee's rejection of Coleman's offer thus was contradictory. The mm-
utes of the finance committee suggest a clear rejection and a lim-
ited duty simply to communicate this rejection to Coleman, but
the report to the board of directors suggests a duty on Pierre to
continue negotiations.
Pierre communicated the finance committee's rejection of the
$160 offer to Coleman's attorney, but he apparently did not sug-
gest that the committee's $125 counteroffer meant that the com-
126. See id. at 103.
127. Id. at 101.
128. See id. at 104.
129. Id. at 105.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 113-15.
133. Id. at 103.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
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mittee contemplated continued negotiations. 13 5 Pierre proceeded to
combine with a number of his associates, junior" executives at Du
Pont to whom Coleman had intended that his stock eventually be
sold, to form a holding company, Du Pont Securities, which even-
tually reached agreement with Coleman for the purchase of all of
his stock, 63,314 shares of common and 14,599 shares of preferred,
at a price of $200 per share for the common stock, and $85 per
share for the preferred.3 6 The holding company then borrowed
more than $8.5 million in a loan from several banks brokered by
J.P Morgan & Company, 87 and the holding company designated a
substantial portion of Coleman's stock as collateral for the loan. 38
Soon after the purchase was made public, Philip Du Pont, a Penn-
sylvania cousin, filed suit in federal court asking that an injunction
be issued requiring that the holding company offer Coleman's
stock to the Du Pont company on the grounds that, (1) Pierre had
deceived both Coleman and the finance committee in a plot to ob-
tain possession of Coleman's stock and control of Du Pont for him-
self, 39 and (2) Pierre had wrongfully used his position as vice pres-
ident of Du Pont to secure the multi-million dollar loan needed to
purchase Coleman's stock.1 40 Philip may have been acting at Al-
fred's direction. In any event, Alfred soon joined Philip as a
plaintiff.14 1
b. Du Pont v Du Pont I
The first issue resulting in an opinion in the Du Pont case"42 was
a matter of discovery. In an attempt to show that Pierre and his
associates had wrongfully used their executive positions at Du
Pont to secure the $8.5 million loan, Philip Du Pont petitioned
Judge Thompson to order Pierre to answer interrogatories con-
cerning all the bank deposits that the Du Pont company had made
135. Id. at 105.
136. Id. at 101-02.
137. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 234 F at 460; 242 F at 119, 121.
138. 242 F at 102, 121.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. The second Du Pont opinion lists Philip as "the original plaintiff," and notes that
Alfred and others are "intervening plaintiffs." Id. at 100.
142. Thompson's interlocutory decree is reported at 234 F 459 (D. Del. 1916).
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following the loan. 143 Philip maintained that he could show that
Pierre and his associates directed the company's funds to the
banks that had participated in the loan.144 Judge Thompson dis-
missed the petition because the "mass of details" sought by the
plaintiffs was "undoubtedly calculated to burden, oppress, and
harass the corporation defendant." 45 The interrogatories appear to
have been broadly drafted;146 they were not restricted to matters
involving the banks that had participated in the loan, but rather
sought information concerning all banks holding Du Pont funds."7
Judge Thompson had to make a decision common in discovery
proceedings, namely, how to determine the appropriate balance be-
tween relevancy and materiality on the one hand, and burden-
someness on the other. Perhaps one can make too much of this
relatively routine discovery decision, but it does not go too far to
infer from Thompson's insistence on narrowly drawn interrogato-
ries that, as may also be implied from Bradford's opinions,
Thompson recognized the need to protect corporate management
from undue harassment by dissatisfied stockholders.
In any event, it may be that Thompson's decree was prompted
by concern more for Du Pont's banks than for Du Pont itself.
Thompson stated that the decree was necessary to protect "bank-
ing institutions in no wise connected with the cause, from being
unduly oppressed and harassed by unnecessarily disclosing their
mtimate business affairs.""14 Moreover, Thompson seemed pre-
pared to allow Philip to go on something of a fishing expedition,
for he held that, because the plaintiffs were suing on behalf of the
company in a derivative action, they were entitled to inspect the
company's books and records for "all information necessary to ar-
rive at the material fact.""49
In this discovery context, then, Thompson was attempting to
strike a balance between the needs for managerial autonomy and
corporate legitimacy- he wanted to protect Du Pont's and the
143. See id. at 459-60.
144. See id. at 460-61.
145. Id. at 462.
146. Id. at 463. See also id. at 459-60.
147. Id. at 463.
148. Id. at 464.
149. Id. at 463.
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banks' corporate privacy as much as possible, but not at the ex-
pense of imposing so many procedural barriers 6n the plaintiffs as
to make it impossible for them to prove a manager's abuse of
power. Thompson believed that by allowing examination of the
books he would be permitting the plaintiffs enough leeway to find
evidence, if it existed, to support their allegations that, (1) Pierre
and his associates wrongfully had used their corporate positions to
reward banks which loaned them the money to purchase Coleman's
stock, and (2) that, contrary to the claims of Pierre, the company
had sufficient funds in its treasury to have purchased Coleman's
stock.
c. Du Pont v Du Pont II
Thompson sought to strike a similar balance when he finally
ruled on the merits of the case. 150 He first appeared to move in the
direction of implementing "corporate legitimacy" by holding Pierre
to the strict duty of a fiduciary. A corporate officer's fiduciary
duty, Thompson stated,
requires him to exercise the utmost good faith in managing the
business affairs of the company with a view to promote, not his
own interests, but the common interests, and he cannot directly
or indirectly derive any personal benefit or advantage by reason
of his position distinct from the coshareholders. 15 '1
If the officer obtained any personal advantage in a transaction
where his personal interest was m conflict with the corporation's
interest, said Thompson, "the law holds the transaction construc-
tively fraudulent and voidable at the election of the corpora-
tion. ' 152 Thompson's comments on corporate officers' fiduciary du-
ties made Du Pont a leading case m corporation law.
Thompson applied his fiduciary standard to Pierre's conduct
and held that Pierre had breached his duties, first by failing to
inform the finance committee of Coleman's belief that the stock
Pierre was offering for $160 was worth $200, and second by failing
to keep negotiations going with Coleman by informing him that
150. Du Pont' v. Du Pont, 242 F 98 (D. Del. 1917).
151. Id. at 136.
152. Id.
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the finance committee did not wish to terminate negotiations with
its $125 counteroffer.15 3 Regarding Coleman's opinion of the worth
of the stock, Thompson believed that an officer such as Pierre was
under a duty of full disclosure of all facts which might inure to the
benefit of the corporation 5 and that, if all of the members of the
corporation's finance committee knew of Coleman's optimistic
evaluation of company prospects, they might have voted to buy the
shares at $160. It appears, however, that to hold Pierre to such a
duty of disclosure was to put form over substance because the
other members of the finance committee were fully aware of the
prospect of profits arising from the company's war contracts upon
which Coleman based his optimistic evaluation. Evaluating the
same information, it was clear that Alfred and, by implication,
William still believed the stock was worth only $125.155
Judge Thompson had another basis besides a fiduciary's duty of
disclosure for his holding that Pierre was under a duty to continue
negotiations, namely, the language of the finance committee's re-
port to the directors, which stated that Pierre was directed "to
take the matter up with Mr. T.C. Du Pont further" after commu-
nicating the $125 counteroffer.'56 Nonetheless, in order to reach
this conclusion Thompson had to dismiss as incomplete the min-
utes of the finance committee's December 24 meeting, which were
signed by all members and which suggest that Pierre was not
under a duty to continue negotiations.15 7 On the existence of
Pierre's duty to continue negotiating, then, there was an adequate
factual basis to reach a conclusion either way It seems fair to spec-
ulate that Thompson's interest in imposing high standards on cor-
porate directors tipped the balance, 158 especially in light of the fact
153. See id. at 135, 137.
154. Id. at 136. Judge Thompson stated, "By assuming the office, [an officer] undertakes
to give his best judgment in the interest of the corporation in all matters in which he is
acting for it untrammeled by hostile interest in himself or others." Id.
155. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 F 129, 150-51 (3d Cir. 1919), modifying 251 F 937 (D. Del.
1918), cert. dented, 250 U.S. 642 (1919). See also A. CHANDLER & S. SALSBURY, supra note
115, at 329-30.
156. See text accompanying note 134 supra. This fact is not noted in the account of the
case in A. CHANDLER & S. SALSBURY, supra note 115, which concludes that Judge Thompson
incorrectly accepted Alfred's version of events.
157. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
158. For other Thompson opinions, which seem to suggest a sensitivity of a need to cir-
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that Thompson believed that "Coleman's conclusion to withdraw
the offer" '159 was reached by Pierre's allegedly misleading Coleman
as to the real action of the finance committee.160
Thompson also ruled that Pierre fraudulently used his position
at the company to secure the $8.5 million loan,161 despite the testi-
mony of several bank presidents that they had participated in the
loan simply because of the personal worth of the participants in
the holding company and the value of the collateral offered.162 In
the course of his opinion, Thompson m effect found Pierre to be a
man without principle who was prepared to sacrifice his relatives
to acquire control of Du Pont.163 Thompson then held that the
company, if it so desired, should be permitted to purchase Cole-
man's stock from Pierre's holding company, Du Pont Securities, at
the price of $200 per share.1 '
Thompson's formulation of a demanding standard of fiduciary
care, his strict application of that standard against Pierre, and his
denunciation of Pierre's conduct might have been calculated, as
was Bradford's opinion m Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., to demon-
strate to the public that the federal district court unflinchingly
would intervene in corporate decisionmaking when confronted with
clear evidence of wrongdoing committed by corporate officers. In
addition, Thompson suggested that he would not ease the standard
cumscribe the activities of corporations and corporate managers, particularly m the interest
of creditors, see, for example, Gibbon v. Hill, 79 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1935), and Wheeler v.
Badenhausen, 260 F 991 (E.D. Pa. 1919). Nonetheless, as suggested earlier, there is ew-
dence that Thompson recognized that corporate managers needed substantial autonomy
with which to operate, and he would not grant relief to shareholders who alleged misconduct
on the part of directors unless the shareholders clearly specified the alleged fraud, collusion,
or want of good faith. Hutchnson v. Philadelphia & G.S.S. Co., 216 F. 795 (E.D. Pa. 1914).
159. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F at 137.
160. Id. Thompson observed:
The finance committee was in favor of purchasing the stock, but that fact and
the reasons for not buying it at $160 had not been stated to Coleman, although
it was rapidly rising m value and Coleman, knowing this, was kept by Pierre in
ignorance of facts which Pierre should have disclosed to him.
Id.
161. See id. at 122.
162. See generally td. at 119-22.
163. Cf. M. DuKE, THE Du PoNrs: PORTRAYAL OF A DYNAsTY 290 (1976). For contemporary
newspaper reports that support this interpretation of Thompson's opinion, see N.Y. Times,
Sept. 16, 1917, § 2, at 2-3; id. Apr. 13, 1917, § 1, at 4.
164. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F. at 137-38.
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of fiduciary care through exceptions or narrow interpretations, but
rather would hold constructively fraudulent any benefit accruing to
an officer in a conflict-of-interest situation.1 15 Thompson's fervency
against the abuse of power in Du Pont can be understood to pro-
mote corporate legitimacy by demonstrating to the public that,
notwithstanding liberalized incorporation statutes, the federal
courts stood ready to prevent officers from reaping personal profits
at the expense of stockholders.""8
Although Thompson sought to enhance corporate legitimacy by
formulating a demanding standard of fiduciary care, he still man-
aged to enhance corporate autonomy by broadly construing the
power given to Du Pont in its charter.1 7 Thompson had to con-
strue corporate powers broadly to hold Pierre accountable for his
conduct because Pierre had defended his holding company's
purchase of Coleman's stock, inter alia, on the ground that Du
Pont did not have sufficient capital surplus on hand lawfully to
purchase Coleman's stock.168 In order to understand this aspect of
Thompson's opinion it is necessary to elaborate on still another
facet of the machinations that led up to the litigation. When
Pierre's cousin Alfred first learned about the holding company's
purchase of Coleman's stock, Alfred had demanded that Pierre
turn the stock over to the Du Pont company.18 9 Pierre at first re-
fused, but then thought better of it and at a meeting of the board
of directors held March 6, 1915, offered the stock to the Du Pont
corporation at the $200 per share his holding company had paid. 7 0
Counsel to the corporation, John P. Laffey, advised the board that
the stock purchase would be illegal because there was not enough
165. See note 152 & accompanying text supra.
166. Thompson also apparently sought to ensure that stockholders would not be deprived
of any limited liability which might have had the effect of encouraging investment. See
Grier v. Union Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 217 F 287 (E.D. Pa. 1914). Thus, while Thompson sought
to maintain standards of fiduciary care, his willingness to limit shareholders' liability in
Gner, an ambiguous case, suggests that Thompson's primary goal may have been the main-
tenance of a healthy market for stock subscription because of the general benefits which
would accrue in a smoothly functioning investment environment.
167. Cf. note 158 supra (Thompson willing to circumscribe corporate activities, but only
if shareholders clearly specified the alleged misconduct).
168. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F at 129.
169. Id. at 123.
170. Id. at 125.
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capital surplus to cover it. 1 ' There is nothing to suggest that Laf-
fey did not believe in the legal advice he offered, although it was
clear that Laffey was acting on Pierre's suggestion. 17 2 Four days
later the board rejected Pierre's offer and, before adjournment,
elected Laffey a director. 17
Perhaps this series of events led Judge Thompson to believe that
Laffey's advice was not free from self-interest; Thompson clearly
disagreed with Laffey's and Pierre's construction of the company's
charter provision. He held that the charter provision, which per-
mitted such purchases to be made with sums set aside out of sur-
plus, did not "exclude the use of other funds of the company m
making such purchases."'I7 So long as the company did not dimin-
ish its liquid assets to the point where its creditors were endan-
gered, Thompson said, it could have used any liquid assets on
hand to purchase Coleman's stock. 7 5 The company's current liquid
assets exceeded $33 million, and Thompson found that it had "am-
ple assets on hand out of which it could lawfully have paid for the
stock without depleting its paid-in capital." 7
Thompson cited no authority to support his conclusion, reached
implicitly, that Pierre and the corporation's board could not rely
on the construction of the difficult legal question reached by the
corporation's counsel, Mr. Laffey. Perhaps sensitive to this diffi-
culty and to the possible charge that he acted on the basis of a
perception that Laffey was not rendering objective advice, Thomp-
son finally decided to limit his intervention m Du Pont's decision-
making to the measures least intrusive of corporate autonomy.
Plaintiffs Philip and Alfred requested Thompson to order the
immediate sale of Coleman's stock to the company without the for-
mality of a stockholders' vote authorizing the company to purchase
the stock. Philip and Alfred argued that Pierre's holding company
would have had to account to the Du Pont company for the spec-
tacular dividends it had earned on Coleman's stock, and the com-
171. Id.
172. Pierre had consulted Laffey earlier. Id. at 123-24. It was Pierre who summoned Laf-
fey to the board of directors' meeting. Id. at 125.
173. A. CHANDLER & S. SALSBURY, supra note 115, at 341.
174. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F at 132.
175. See id. at 133-34.
176. Id. at 134.
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pany then would have been in a position to use those dividends to
purchase Coleman's stock without expending any of its own assets.
Further, the sale would have been an extremely profitable bargain
for Du Pont:177 the company could have acquired the stock at a
court-ordered rate of $200 per share at a time when the company's
wartime activities had raised the market price to $900 per share.
No stockholder in his right mind, Philip and Alfred argued, would
reject such a bargain. Consequently, they urged that there was no
need to take the matter up with the stockholders; rather, they
prayed that Thompson simply order that the transfer of stock take
place.178
Judge Thompson, however, refused to order the transfer of stock
without a stockholders' vote on the ground that "that question of
business policy is not one for the determination of the court." 179
Even though it was "a foregone conclusion that its acquisition
would be of enormous profit to the company,"1 80 the stock had to
remain temporarily in the possession of Pierre's holding company
because Thompson refused to substitute his judgment for that of
the corporation in a matter of business policy. Thompson realized
that such a decision normally was made by the board of directors
of Du Pont, but because the board was controlled by Pierre and a
majority of the board had an interest in Coleman's stock through
its participation m Du Pont Securities Company, Thompson or-
dered that the shareholders vote."'1 To guarantee the fairness of
the procedure, Thompson ordered that a special master supervise
the vote.182 In addition, Thompson barred Pierre from voting the
shares purchased from Coleman, although Pierre was allowed to
vote his own substantial block of stock.183
177. See Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 F 129, 185 (3d Cir. 1919).
178. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 F 937, 941-42 (D. Del. 1918).
179: Du Pont v. Du Pont, 242 F at 137.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. In affirming the eventual results of the shareholder vote, Thompson rationalized his
refusal to bar Pierre from voting his own stock on the ground that the "court cannot deprive
one who is interested adversely to the alleged interests of the corporation and other stock-
holders from exercising his right to vote his stock." Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 F. at 945.
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d. The Aftermath: Du Pont v Du Pont III
Pierre appears to have been deeply hurt by Thompson's asser-
tions that Pierre had committed fraud and breached his fiduciary
duties. To demonstrate that he sought little profit for himself from
his participation in Coleman's sale of stock, Pierre promised that if
the shareholders' vote went against him, he would compensate his
colleagues in the Du Pont Securities company'T for the loss of
their shares by transferring stock to them from his personal, origi-
nal holdings in Du Pont. Pierre believed that his colleagues de-
served to be compensated because they were the managers who so
dramatically had increased the company's earnings. l 5 Whatever
the eventual outcome, Pierre apparently believed that he might
lose the crucial shareholder vote because of the allegations of fraud
against him and because of some other possible legal battles. 86
Still, Pierre won the shareholder's vote, 312,587 to 157,959.187
Judge Thompson then refused to reverse the stockholders' deci-
sion,188 despite allegations that Pierre or his associates had unduly
influenced a number of stockholders. 8" "The question of influence
exerted upon other stockholders," Thompson stated, "would in-
volve an inquiry by the court into the motives which actuated each
stockholder in depositing his vote which it is beyond the power or
policy of the courts to pursue." 190
Thompson's refusal to overrule the stockholders where they had
implicitly approved what Thompson had decreed to be an abuse of
power by one of Du Pont's executives indicates the high premium
that Thompson placed on maximum freedom for the exercise of
corporate business judgments. In particular, Thompson stated that
a reasonable shareholder might have wished to vote in accordance
with Pierre's desires m order to keep Pierre, and the same manage-
ment team that recently had done so well, in control.191
Taken together, Thompson's three Du Pont decisions seem to be
184. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
185. Id.
186. See generally A. CHanDLER & S. SALSBURY, supra note 115, at 350-52.
187. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 251 F 937, 938.
188. See zd. at 946.
189. See id. at 939-40.
190. Id. at 945.
191. Id. at 943.
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an attempt to strike an appropriate balance between legitimacy
and autonomy- Thompson served the legitimizing function by for-
mulating a strict fiduciary duty and finding Pierre guilty of fraud,
but Thompson also preserved corporate autonomy, while ostensi-
bly implementing shareholder democracy, by leaving it up to the
shareholders of Du Pont, if they desired, to rectify the results of
Pierre's wrongdoing.
The Morrs Period: Maintaining the Balance
1. Eagleson, Atlantic Refining, Myers, and Hodgman: Re-
straining Interference but Preventing Abuses
a. Eagleson, Atlantic Refining, and Meyers
The Delaware federal district court continued to emphasize the
availability of democratic restraints on management after Hugh
Martin Morris was appointed in 1918. Morris's willingness to check
the abuse of power, suggested by his comments regarding Pierre S.
Du Pont,192 is illustrated by his decision in Eagleson v. Pacific
Timber Co.193 In Eagleson, revolution in Mexico had rendered Pa-
cific Timber's property in that country virtually worthless, driving
the corporation into insolvency 194 Pacific devised a reorganization
plan whereby all the assets of the old corporation would be trans-
ferred to a new one.195 Those holding common stock in Pacific
could exchange their stock for an equal number of shares in the
new corporation.198 Holders of preferred stock also were allowed to
exchange their stock for preferred stock in the new corporation,
but only if they paid $10 per share for preferred stock they sought
to acquire. 19 7 Preferred stock in the new corporation also was avail-
able to the public at $10 per share.9 8 Shareholders who held both
common and preferred stock in the original corporation could not
participate in the exchange plan for common stockholders unless
they purchased an amount of preferred stock in the new corpora-
192. See text accompanying note 45 supra.
193. 270 F 1008 (D. Del. 1920).
194. Id. at 1009.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1010.
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tion equal to the amount they held in the original corporation. 19'
Eagleson, a holder of common and preferred stock in Pacific, chal-
lenged the reorganization plan200 on the ground that he was not
being treated equally with other common stockholders.
Judge Morris held that, by effectively, denying preferred stock-
holders the privilege of participating in- the exchange plan. Pacific
ignored the preemptive rights preferred stockholders were sup-
posed to enjoy over common stockholders,201 as "the effect of the
reorganization plan was the complete forfeiture of the preferred
stock. 20 2 Morris thus insisted that Pacific adhere to the spirit of
its original charter provisions2 3 even though the reorganization
plan was passed by majority vote204 and the plaintiffs had made no
specific suggestion of deception on the part of management.
The right to participate in the new corporation, Morris stated,
"must be equally favorable to all stockholders of the same class,
and a denial of such equality of opportunity is a legal fraud
upon the stockholders thus discriminated against. ' 20 5 Morris found
that the plan imposed a disproportionate burden on stockholders
who held both common and preferred stock, 2  and because few
common stockholders fell into this category,20 obviously "the plan
of reorganization was for the benefit of the majority, to the detri-
ment of the minority, and consequently unfair and fraudulent."" 8
Morris followed a long line of authority that demanded equal
rights for similarly-situated shareholders and was thus prepared to
undermine corporate autonomy to the extent necessary to protect
minority rights.20 '
Morris was unwilling, however, to place great restraints on cor-
porate management. Morris often used procedural requirements to
strike the balance between managerial autonomy and corporate de-
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 1011.
204. Id. at 1009.
205. Id.
206. See id. at 1011.
207. See id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1010.
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mocracy Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp.210
best illustrates Morris's procedural balance. In Atlantic Refining,
Port Lobos contracted with Atlantic to sell all the oil it produced
in consideration for Atlantic's loan for the construction of pipe-
lines. 211 A breach of contract suit arose from a dispute as to the
amount of oil the contract obligated Port Lobos to supply to At-
lantic.212 Denis, a stockholder of Port Lobos, petitioned for leave to
intervene in the case on Port Lobos's behalf on the ground that
Port Lobos was so closely connected with Atlantic that it could not
present an adequate defense, and that the inadequacy of the de-
fense would damage Port Lobos's minority shareholders.2 18 Denis
alleged that Atlantic owned a majority of Port Lobos's stock and
designated a majority of Port Lobos's board of directors from "per-
sons directly connected with or controlled by [Atlantic]."2 "
Judge Morris had to decide when to permit a stockholder of a
defendant corporation to intervene as a party defendant.215 The is-
sue was within the court's equitable discretion and an issue of first
impression in the Delaware district court.2" Judge Morris dis-
missed Dems's petition on the ground that Denis alleged no spe-
cific facts to support the charge that Port Lobos was acting against
the interests of its minority stockholders.217 "A petition founded
upon fraud or misconduct," Morris stated, "which does not allege
definite, tangible facts to sustain the general charge of fraud, is
insufficient and cannot be sustained. 2 1  Denis had to do more
than allege that Atlantic and Port Lobos entered into a collusive
suit to defraud Port Lobos's stockholders. In essence, Morris im-
posed two procedural hurdles to a successful intervenor alleging
collusion: Denis had to show Port Lobos's unwillingness to defend
itself2 19 and his own ability to present a viable defense.
220
210. 280 F 934 (D. Del. 1922).
211. See id. at 936.
212. See id.
213. See generally id. at 936-37.
214. Id. at 937.
215. Id. at 939.
216. See id. at 937.
217. Id. at 940.
218. Id. at 939.
219. See id. Morris stated:
Where it is alleged that the directors of a defendant corporation refuse to de-
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Although Morris formulated strict procedural requirements for
intervention by a stockholder, there was no objection to Denis's
right to amend his petition,221 and Morris gave Denis leave to
amend his petition to meet the procedural requirements.2 22 In ad-
dition, Morris enhanced Denis's right to intervene by holding that,
in making the decision on the appropriateness of the intervention,
the court would assume that the petitioner's allegations were true
without requiring supporting affidavits.223
Morris's refusal to close the doors on Denis's petition ultimately
redounded to Denis's favor. In a later opinion in Atlantic Refin-
ing,224 Morris held that Denis finally had alleged sufficient facts for
Morris to allow intervention in the case.225 This time, Denis in-
cluded a long list of specific allegations in his amended petition.2 2
Not only did Atlantic have a controlling interest in Port Lobos,
Denis maintained, but Port Lobos had been reorganized to merge
with one of Atlantic's subsidiaries.227 Denis further alleged that the
reorganized Port Lobos had assumed the obligation under the old
contract to sell Atlantic its oil even though it was under no legal
compulsion to do SO, 2 28 that the sale of all its oil at the contract
rate of twenty-five cents per barrel was ruinous to Port Lobos, 29
fend a suit to the prejudice of stockholders, a court of equity will permit one or
more stockholders to intervene and become parties defendant, so as to file an
answer, not for the corporation, but on their own behalf, to protect their own
interest, and that of all other stockholders who may choose to join them in the
defense.
Id. (citations omitted).
220. See id. at 940.
A petition by a stockholder, asking leave to be made a party defendant to set
up a defense not made by the corporation, must disclose the facts constituting
the defense; otherwise, the court has no means of knowing whether the de-
fense, if permitted to be made, would be other than frivolous.
Id.
221. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 283 F 681, 682 (D. Del. 1922).
222. Id. at 683.
223. See Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 280 F. at 938-39; 283 F. at 682-
83.
224. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Port Lobos Petroleum Corp., 283 F at 681.
225. See id. at 682-83.
226. See id. at 681-82.
227. Id. at 681.
228. See id. at 682.
229. Id. at 681.
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and that Port Lobos had assumed these obligations over the objec-
tions of its minority stockholders.30 Once these alleged facts met
Morris's standards, then he appeared willing to allow intervention.
Despite Morris's decision to allow intervention in Atlantic Re-
fining, Morris was not eager to push the equitable powers of his
court to the limits to guard against managerial or majority stock-
holder wrongdoing. In Meyers v. Occidental Oil Corp.,31 plaintiff
Meyers alleged that defendant Occidental Corporation was insol-
vent, that Occidental had unlawfully issued stock to its officers,
and that the officers had converted the assets of the corporation to
their own use.23 2 Meyers petitioned the court to appoint a receiver
to sell Occidental's assets,33 to distribute the proceeds of the sale
to the shareholders,23' and to cancel the allegedly unlawfully issued
stock.23 5
Meyers sought relief under the same Delaware receivership stat-
ute that Judge Bradford, in Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., boldly
had held applicable in federal court proceedings.23 6 Meyers alleged
that the insolvency was the result of fraud, but did not offer
proof. '7 Further, Meyers advanced no authority to support the
proposition that the equitable relief he sought could be granted by
a federal court without a statutory provision, although he did ar-
gue that a statute was not necessary since one statute, that of Lou-
isiana, was simply "declaratory of pre-existing equitable rights.2 38
Morris rejected the notion that such equitable powers existed for
his court.' 9 Morris declared that he could not appoint a receiver
without proof of insolvency because "the appointment of a receiver
is merely a remedy incidental and ancillary to the primary object
of litigation, and cannot itself constitute such primary object. '2 40
In this manner, Morris appears to have rejected the means of regu-
230. See id. at 682.
231. 288 F 997 (D. Del. 1923).
232. Id.
233. Id. at 998.
234. See id.
235. Id. at 999.
236. See text accompanying notes 56-79 supra.
237. 288 F at 999.
238. Myers v. Occidental Oil Corp., 288 F at 1002.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1001.
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lating corporations embraced by Judge Bradford,2 41 and thus he
limited the interventionary powers of his own court. In this man-
ner he might be seen to have attempted to protect corporate au-
tonomy against novel remedies sought by dissatisfied stockholders.
Nonetheless, as was true in Atlantic Refining, Morris did not
want to make a judicial remedy totally inaccessible to stockholders.
Meyers chose not to sue the officers,4 2 perhaps because they were
not residents of Delaware and service upon them would have been
difficult. Judge Morris offered alternative means of bringing the of-
ficers to account for their abuse of power. Morris observed that
shares in a corporation's capital stock were personal property hav-
ing their situs in the incorporating state,243 and a suit seeking the
cancellation of stock unlawfully issued by a Delaware corporation
"may be brought in this district and service had . . .on defen-
dants residing elsewhere. 2 44 Morris indicated that his court also
could assert in rem jurisdiction over corporate assets unlawfully
converted by officers if those assets were located in Delaware.
Judge Morris appears to have believed in the importance of
maintaining the viability of litigation as a means of correcting cor-
porate wrongs, and thus he may have tried to lower some procedu-
ral barriers that otherwise might have impeded stockholder litiga-
tion. Morris realized, however, that totally lax procedural
standards might lead to harassment of corporations by dissatisfied
stockholders filing frivolous suits. For example, Morris's strict
pleading requirements enhanced corporate autonomy by allowing
corporations with closely connected directorates to do business
with minimal fear of frivolous suits by disenchanted stockholders.
Morris stressed that it was not impermissible for such corporations
to do business with each other.245 Morris solved the problem by
subjecting stockholder-litigants.to strict pleading standards when
they alleged corporate wrongdoing. At the same time, he provided
procedural alternatives to stockholder-litigants when the strict
pleading requirements threatened to prevent litigation and thus
241. See note 236 supra.
242. See 288 F at 998.
243. Id. at 1003.
244. Id.
245. In Myers, Judge Morris expressly recognized that "corporations controlled and man-
aged by the same officers and stockholders have a right to deal with each other." Id. at 939.
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deprive his court of an opportunity to prevent the abuse of power.
As was true with the opinions of Bradford and Thompson, then,
Morris's procedural decisions in Meyers and Atlantic Refining
seem to represent an attempt to strike a balance, to generate a
level of stockholder litigation sufficient to allow the court to serve
its legitimizing function but without encouraging so much litiga-
tion that desirable corporate activities would be undermined.
b. The Hodgman Case
In Hodgman v. Atlantic Refining C0.246 Morris once again was
called upon to protect stockholders from the alleged abuse of
power by corporate managers. In Hodgman, Atlantic Refining
Company and Superior Oil Company agreed that Atlantic would
cancel a $2.5 million debt owed by Superior if Superior would
transfer to Atlantic 325,000 shares of Superior's common stock, en-
abling Atlantic to acquire Superior's stock at approximately $8 per
share. 47 A roughly contemporaneous arrangement that may have
been part of the deal obligated Atlantic to buy all of Superior's oil
output for ten years.248 At the same time, Superior completed
other financing arrangements with a syndicate of underwriters,
who had negotiated to purchase other shares of Superior for $16
per share, and eventually sold those shares to the public for about
$19 per share.2 49 Finally, during this period Old Dominion Oil
Company had conveyed land to Superior in exchange for still other
shares of Superior's stock at a rate of about $16 per share. s 0
The president of Superior, Robert M. Catts, received 45,000
shares of Superior, apparently as compensation for closing the deal
with Atlantic Refining.251 The evidence established that Catts in-
tentionally misrepresented the price paid by Atlantic for Supe-
rior's shares, both to Superior's board of directors and to the un-
derwriters who were buying shares at $16 per share, 52 leading
246. 300 F 590 (D. Del. 1924), reu'd, 13 F.2d 781 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 731
(1926).
247. Id. at 591.
248. Id. at 592.
249. See id. at 591.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 595.
252. Id. at 596-98.
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Superior's board of directors and the underwriters to believe that
Atlantic was paying $16 per share.253 While the misrepresentations
were being made to Superior's board, E.J. Henry, an officer of At-
lantic who sat on Superior's board, remained silent, though he
knew that Atlantic was in effect paying $8, not $16, per share.2" It
appears that the underwriters eventually found out about the mis-
representation but raised no objection. The plaintiff, a minority
shareholder in Superior, alleged that the sale of Superior stock to
Atlantic was fraudulent and requested that the sale be set aside.
Judge Morris declared that the sale of Superior shares to Atlan-
tic was "consistent with no hypothesis other than that of deliber-
ate fraud." 255 He reached this conclusion not only on the basis of
the discrepancy in the prices between the sales to Atlantic and to
the underwriters, but because the discrepancy was accompanied by
false statements made by Catts to Superior's board of directors
and to the underwriters.256 Morris declared tht the position of the
president of a corporation was "fiduciary to a high degree," and
that
[o]ccupying such a position of trust, honesty and fair dealing, as
well as the law, require that in transactions with the corporation
in which transactions the president or director has a personal
interest, there must be the fullest disclosure, the utmost good
faith, and no secret profits touring to the officer or director from
the transaction. 257
Judge Morris found that Catts had made misrepresentations, 2 8
and had profited personally259 by receiving 45,000 shares of Supe-
rior stock. Consequently, Judge Morris ruled that the sale of stock
to Atlantic was fraudulent 260 and set the sale aside. Further, Mor-
ris reasoned, Atlantic was equally guilty of the fraud because its
officer, Henry, had knowledge of misrepresentations made to Supe-
253. Id.
254. Id. at 596.
255. Id. at 598.
256. See td. at 595-98.
257. Id. at 594.
258. Id. at 591.
259. See id. at 594.
260. Id. at 598.
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nor's board and to its stockholders,2"' and because Atlantic also
knew about misrepresentations to the syndicate of underwriters.8 2
Morris granted relief against Atlantic, and it appears that his
desire to discourage corporate fraud led him to formulate a crea-
tive remedy By the time Morris decided the liability issue, the
market value of Superior's stock had dropped to $4 per share. 2 3
The usual remedy in such a case would have been recission of the
contract with a refund of Atlantic's money 2 64 This remedy, how-
ever, would have entailed a transfer of wealth from Superior's
stockholders to one of the guilty parties, Atlantic. To prevent At-
lantic's unjust enrichment, Morris ordered Atlantic to pay Supe-
rior $2.5 million, the difference between the amount actually paid
to Superior and the amount Atlantic would have paid if the price
had been $16 per share.28 5 Borrowing from the law of contracts,
Judge Morris thus sought to do equity where the tort remedy
would reward a wrongdoer.286 Atlantic and the miscreant managers
had to be punished for their abuse of power; apparently the loss
Atlantic suffered from the decreasing market value of Superior's
stock was insufficient retribution.
The Nields Period: Preserving the Balance
Several corporations cases decided by Judge John P Nields, ap-
pointed in 1930 to replace Judge Morris, establish Nields's com-
mitment to preserving the balance between managerial autonomy
and corporate democracy Mallery v. Managers' Securities Co.
267
arose as a result of an attempt by the majority stockholders in
Managers' Securities Company to shift part of a $25 million debt
onto the minority Managers' had been set up by General Motors
in 1923 as a profit-sharing program for its managers. By the time
Mallery was decided, the company had two stockholder classes.268
261. See id. at 596.
262. See td. at 596-97.
263. Id. at 600.
264. See generally td.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 591.
267. 1 F Supp. 942 (D. Del. 1932), rev'd, 77 F.2d 186 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 593
(1935).
268. See id. at 942.
[Vol. 23:725
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
Pursuant to Managers' charter, class A stockholders, all of whom
were then employed by GM, received special dividends from the
proceeds of a "5 after 7" contract with GM, which provided that
Managers' would receive five percent of GM's net income over a
seven percent return on the company's investment. 69 Managers'
class B stockholders received dividends from 2.25 million shares of
GM stock owned by Managers'.27 0 According to Managers' charter,
only current GM executives were entitled to hold class A stock.271
At the company's inception, the executives whom GM sought to
involve were sold an equal number of class A and class B shares.7
When any of the executives terminated their employment at GM,
they were required to allow Managers' to repurchase their class A
stock.27 3
In 1928, the current class A stockholders approved a program
whereby they would forego the dividends from their class A stock
in order to enhance Managers' future earning capacity.2 74 Pursuant
to this plan, Managers', after procuring a $25 million loan from
J.P Morgan & Company,'7 5 purchased additional GM stock2 76 and
began retiring the loan gradually with income from the "5 after 7"
contract.277 Had the loan and the extra investment in GM stock
not been made, of course, the income from the "5 after 7" contract
would have been paid to the class A shareholders.2 78
Managers' suffered a great loss on their 1928 investment in GM
stock because of the 1929 stock market crash.279 The market value
of Managers' GM stock plummeted, and the income from the "5
after 7" contract vanished, leaving Managers' with a great debt to
Morgan which it could not pay.28 Managers' was forced to dis-
269. See id. at 942-43.
270. See id. at 943.
271. See id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 944.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. See id. at 945.
278. See generally id.
279. See td.
280. See id.
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solve. 28 1 During dissolution, Managers' decided to allocate the J.P
Morgan debt among both the class A and class B stockholders. 2
Following this decision, Mallery, a former GM executive who held
only class B stock, filed suit.' 8 He challenged the dissolution plan
on the ground that the class A stockholders, who held a majority
interest in the company, were attempting to shift part of the Mor-
gan debt onto the minority stockholders, who held only class B
stock.2 s4 Mallery contended that the charter provisions that man-
dated separate accounts for class A and class B stockholders, and
the original plan that the loan would be repaid only from the "5
after 7" contract proceeds, showed that the class A account should
absorb the debt.286
Nields struck down Managers' dissolution plan and held for
Mallery on the ground that, from the company's beginning, the
stockholders intended to keep the class A and class B accounts
completely separate.8 " The class A account always was separate
from the class B account, and "it follows as a necessary legal con-
sequence that the investment of that fund is for the sole account of
class A stockholders. '287 If the benefits from the 1928 stock
purchase would have been enjoyed by class A stockholders alone,
the burdens of loss could not be shifted onto the entire com-
pany 288 Further, the judge also was impressed with the argument
that Managers' charter provided for separate class A surplus and
general surplus accounts: "Class A stockholders having agreed with
the class B stockholders in and by defendant's charter that the
proceeds of the '5 after 7 contract' should constitute a separate
fund for the sole benefit of class A stockholders," 289 they could not
disregard the charter and avoid in part the burden of the J.P Mor-
gan debt. Consequently, the Managers' Company could not in ef-
fect violate its charter and make the class B stockholders bear part
281. See td.
282. See id.
283. See id. at 942.
284. See id. at 945.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 945-46.
287. Id. at 946.
288. See id.
289. Id.
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of the loss arising from the stock purchase. With this reasoning,
Nields attempted to protect Managers' minority stockholders
against an abuse of power by the majority stockholders when the
majority stockholders allocated the burdens of corporate
misfortune.
Judge Nields continued to guard against corporate abuses of
power in In re Mississippi Valley Utilities Corp.290 In Mississippi
Valley, Nields overturned an adjudication of bankruptcy because
Mississippi Valley had failed to adhere to its charter provisions in
calling a meeting where the shareholders voted to seek bank-
ruptcy 29' The company's failure to give notice of the meeting to all
of its stockholders, said Neilds, required setting aside the adjudica-
tion.292 Nields further insisted on procedural regularity. He set
aside the adjudication in spite of a second stockholders' meeting
which had satisfied the notice requirement mandated by his court's
earlier decree, and which sought to "ratify" the court's bankruptcy
adjudication. 293 "The [bankruptcy] adjudication," Nields stated,
"is the act of the court. The stockholders and directors can ratify
their own acts but cannot ratify and make valid an adjudication of
the court upon an invalid petition. ' 294 Nields insisted that the
stockholders meet again, in accordance with the charter's notice
requirement, and vote to seek another bankruptcy adjudication.9 5
Nields's glorification of form over substance in Mississippi Val-
ley might have been designed as a signal to corporate officers that
the federal court in Delaware would not tolerate even procedural
irregularities. Many of the procedural requirements included in
corporate charters, of course, were intended to protect stockhold-
ers from the abuse of power by managers-m short, to ensure that
the appearance and reality of corporate democracy would be pre-
served. Nields's decision thus gave some assurance that the judici-
ary would stand alert against potential inroads to corporate
democracy
Although careful to guard against corporate abuse of power,
290. 2 F Supp. 995 (D. Del. 1933).
291. See id. at 998.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 997.
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Nields's decision in Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.296 indi-
cates that, like Bradford and Morris, Nields also could exercise
self-restraint in interfering with managerial autonomy even when
he may have disagreed personally with the results reached by cor-
porate decisionmakers. The Koplar case arose from a stockholder's
objections to the financial remuneration that Warner Brothers Pic-
tures had conferred on three of its officers, the three brothers
Warner.297 Pursuant to a contract of employment entered into in
late 1928, Warner Brothers issued 90,000 shares of common stock,
then worth $10,000,000, to the brothers and agreed to pay them
$10,000 a week for their services over the next six years.29 In addi-
tion to agreeing to work for the company in return for their sala-
ries, the brothers agreed not to compete with the company 299 In a
derivative suit, Koplar challenged this salary agreement on the
grounds that, (1) it operated as a fraud on the stockholders, and
(2) the stock issued to the brothers was without consideration and
therefore illegal under the laws of Delaware.300
Judge Nields held that the salary agreement was neither fraudu-
lent nor illegal. Nields found that it was "perfectly apparent" that
"the major consideration for the delivery of the 90,000 shares of
common stock was the past and future financial aid of the Warner
brothers to the Warner Company." 01 In leaner times, it appeared,
the brothers had given generously their Warner stock to the com-
pany to be used to secure financing.3 0 2 Nields also found no fraud
practiced on the stockholders because they had ratified the agree-
ment at their 1928 meeting,303 and "[d]urmg the years 1929, 1930
and 1931 not a single stockholder voted against the re-election of
the Warner slate of directors. Not a single stockholder ever com-
plained of the employment contract so long as the company was
296. 19 F Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1937).
297. Id. at 174. In addition to the Warners, another director, Waddill Catchings, received
financial remuneration. The plaintiff was most concerned with the activities and liability of
the three Warner brothers, as the amended pleadings indicate. See id. at 174-75.
298. Id. at 175, 180.
299. Id. at 180.
300. See id. at 175.
301. Id. at 181.
302. See generally id. at 182.
303. Id. at 181-82.
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making money "304 Nields did not think it appropriate to intervene
on Koplar's behalf because the salary agreement had been exe-
cuted in the open, with the knowledge and acquiescence of
Warner's stockholders. A reversal of the stockholders' decision to
support the salary agreement, Nields must have reasoned, would
have undermined seriously Warner's managerial autonomy.
Nields also found that, even if the agreement had been fraudu-
lent, the stockholders already had resolved the dispute through
their ratification of a "settlement" of other lawsuits that chal-
lenged the employment contract drafted by Warner's board of di-
rectors. 05 Pursuant to this settlement, the brothers transferred
100,000 shares of common stock back to the company and surren-
dered their claim to $680,000 m back pay, and the company sur-
rendered all claims to the money already earned by the brothers
under the agreement.30 Nields, observing that the settlement ap-
peared to be a fair compromise,30 held that the company had sat-
isfactorily dealt with the issues raised by Koplar in his derivative
suit and dismissed Koplar's bill of complaint.308
Nields's support of the compromise agreement, however, may
not have meant that he approved of the brothers' conduct. Refer-
ring to the $10,000 weekly salaries voted to them by the board of
directors on which they sat, Nields stated:
As a matter of morals such payments may be questioned. Direc-
tors have the power to award just compensation. That power
should be used, not abused. Fair human reqmrements should set
some limits to salaries. Extraordinary talent is not acquired. If it
were, it would not be extraordinary. Doubtless it is an endow-
ment which the holder should not place on the auction block. 09
Yet, Nields did not allow his opinion of a fair salary to interfere
with his determination of the case, but rather let the stockholders
304. Id. at 183.
305. See id. at 184-85.
306. Id. at 185.
307. Id.
308. See generally zd. at 188. Attorneys for Koplar argued that the settlement was invalid
because the notice for the 1935 stockholders' meeting failed to disclose important facts. Id.
at 186. Nields found, however, that "the stockholders were adequately and sufficiently in-
formed." Id.
309. Id. at 188.
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decide the salary question for themselves.
Indeed, it appears that Nields's moral scruples against the com-
pensation awarded to the Warner brothers was counterbalanced by
his obvious admiration for the brothers' business success prior to
the depression. Nields particularly was impressed by the brothers'
courage in concocting million-dollar schemes to finance their enter-
prises, which enabled them to become "pioneers in the 'talk-
ies.' "310 Nields wrote of these machinations in seeming awe:
Their plan of financing their business through bank credits m-
stead of advances from franchise holders was a move involving
millions. Their acquisition of a great chain of theaters to use
their films was a step involving more millions. To keep abreast
of the march of time demanded extraordinary and heroic
efforts."' 1
There are several reasons why Nields was so impressed with the
Warner brothers' activities that he spoke of them as "extraordi-
nary" and "heroic," terms which he similarly applied to Theodore
Roosevelt and Pierre S. Du Pont. 12 First, at least until the depres-
sion was well underway, the brothers succeeded to earn staggering
sums of money through their daring management of the com-
pany 1 Nields also may have been impressed that the brothers
continued to tie their fortunes to those of the company, even in
dark times:
In the fiscal year ending August 31, 1929, the net profits were
$17,271.805. For the six months ending March 1, 1930, the net
profits were $10,092,109. For the fiscal year ending August 30,
1930, the net profits were $7,074,621, despite the fact that the
last half of that fiscal year showed a net operating loss of
$3,000,000. Thereafter as the depression deepened the Com-
pany's losses increased. Throughout the depression the Brothers
continued to loan the Company substantial amounts. 14
Finally, Nields must have noticed that the public enjoyed perhaps
its most absorbing, if frivolous, diversions from the economic ago-
310. Id. at 182.
311. Id.
312. See text accompanying notes 47 & 51-52 supra.
313. See generally Koplar v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 19 F Supp. at 182-83.
314. Id. at 183.
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nies of the depression because the brothers pioneered efforts in de-
veloping "talkies." It seems more than coincidental that Judge
Nields, who had the habit of sneaking off to the movies at lunch
time, appears to have been a devoted fan of "class B cowboy
pictures."31 5
Nields's Koplar decision, then, may have been calculated to pre-
serve what he believed to be the invaluable benefits of manage-
ment autonomy by allowing the stockholders' and managers' set-
tlement decision on the Warner brothers' salaries to stand,
although Nields's beliefs about his "legitinizmg" function may
have led him to admonish the Warner brothers for reaping such
lavish financial rewards. Neilds's Koplar decision thus may have
suggested to corporate officers that, under his guidance, the district
court would hesitate to intrude upon management autonomy un-
less the corporate decisionmakmg process was so defective that no
possibility of self-correction existed. In short, Nields's self-re-
straint may have rested on the corporation's capacity for self-
correction.
THE THIRD CIRCUIT: SHIFTING THE BALANCE
Despite the efforts of the Delaware district court to strike a com-
promising balance between managerial autonomy and corporate
democracy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit consistently shifted the balance in favor of managerial auton-
omy. An analysis of Du Pont, Hodgman, and Mallery, three rele-
vant appellate decisions during this period, shows the analytical
approach of the Third Circuit in creating this shift, and demon-
strates a striking contrast to the opinions of the district court ex-
amined above.""6
Du Pont v Du Pont
After losing the shareholder vote that the district court or-
dered,31  Alfred and Philip Du Pont took their case to the Third
315. Wilmington News-Journal, Dec. 19, 1975, at 12.
316. Compare with what follows the text accompanying notes 114-191 supra (Du Pont),
the text accompanying notes 246-266 supra (Hodgman), and the text accompanying notes
267-289 supra (Mallery).
317. See text accompanying notes 179-183 supra.
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Circuit, 318 contending that Judge Thompson had erred by failing to
order the immediate transfer of Coleman's stock to the Du Pont
company Judge Joseph Buffington, delivering the opinion of the
court of appeals, not only held that the shareholders' decision not
to purchase Coleman's stock was a matter of business policy be-
yond the judiciary's purview, 319 but extensively reevaluated the
facts and declared that Pierre had not violated any of his fiduciary
duties in participating in the acquisition of Coleman's stock.3 20
Buffington held that Pierre was not under a continuing duty to
negotiate with Coleman on behalf of the company for the purchase
of Coleman's stock because the finance committee had decisively
rejected Coleman's offer. 21 The court reached this conclusion by
relying on both Pierre's interpretation of finance committee events
and on the text of the finance committee's minutes. 22 It is note-
worthy that Judge Thompson reached an opposite inference as to
the facts and that Buffington gave no explanation of the appellate
court's assumption of authority to rule on the factual question that
was Thompson's province as the trial court judge. Further, the ap-
pellate court minimized the importance of the finance committee's
report to the board of directors,323 suggesting opaquely that the
language that directed Pierre to "take the matter up with Mr. T
C. Du Pont further" was simply a "courteous way" of directing
Pierre to reject "what Coleman regarded as a generous offer. '3 24
The Third Circuit's relatively narrow interpretation of Pierre's
fiduciary duties as a Du Pont executive and its repeated assertions
that Pierre was not guilty of fraud suggest that the court favored
the enlargement of management's discretion beyond the range es-
tablished in the district court by Judge Thompson. Thompson had
held that any personal benefit reaped by managers was construc-
tively fraudulent, but the Third Circuit in effect held that manag-
ers could pursue actively their own interests. The court appears to
318. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 F 129 (3d Cir. 1919), modifying 251 F 937 (D. Del. 1918),
cert. denied, 250 U.S. 642 (1919).
319. See id. at 184.
320. See td. at 174.
321. See id. at 172.
322. See transcripts of testimony and committee minutes, id. at 142-74.
323. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
324. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 F at 154-55.
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have acknowledged that the finance committee gave vague instruc-
tions to Pierre and that the instructions might be construed, in the
way Philip and Alfred suggested, to place Pierre under a continu-
ing duty to act for the committee, and not for himself.2 5 Nonethe-
less, the court urged that Pierre was justified in believing that his
duty to negotiate on behalf of the company had ended, and Pierre
therefore could proceed to act on ns own initiative and in his own
interest because the instructions were vague, and because the other
members of the finance committee, who disagreed with Pierre in
interpreting the instructions, had several opportunities to reaffirm
Pierre's agency on behalf of the finance committee yet chose not to
do so.s26
It seems likely that the district court's Judge Thompson was try-
ing to establish some basic mechanisms of stockholder democracy
without seriously interfering with corporate autonomy, and it also
seems likely that he was writing with the public audience in mind.
Nonetheless, the Third Circuit's opinion in Du Pont, its long sum-
mary of the facts, and its interpretation consistently favorable to
Pierre, was probably designed for a somewhat different audience,
the corporate managers. Perhaps the Third Circuit wished to reas-
sure the corporate managers that, where they believed themselves
to be acting m good faith, in the best interests of their companies,
the federal courts would not hamstring them. Apparently, the
court of appeals was most impressed that, although Pierre exe-
cuted his scheme to seize personal control of the company and re-
moved some of his relatives from influential positions, he did so
because he believed that the company's situation demanded it.
325. See generally ld. at 157. The court called the instructions "vague, indefinite, and
conditional." Id.
326. Id. at 157. Judge Buffington's understanding of the corporate director's role seems
consistent with human nature, primarily because Bufflngton understood the difficulty of
proceeding under vague instructions. Buffington's construction of the duty of corporate
fiduciaries, however, appears to have departed from what currently is recognized as the
usual standard of care in corporate opportunity cases. This standard was best articulated by
Justice Cardozo, in a case involving "joint adventurers," and is words, in content if not in
phrasing, are similar to Judge Thompson's. See text accompanying notes 151-152 supra.
Cardozo stated that businessmen who bore a fiduciary relationship to each other were to be
held "to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is [for them] the standard of behavior." Meinhard
v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928).
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Some testimony in the case clearly supports this view, though that
testimony did not weigh heavily with Judge Thompson.2
For example, the Third Circuit suggested that both its holding
and factual finding were influenced by factors ignored by Thomp-
son, such as Pierre's belief that it was necessary to relieve Coleman
of his stockholdings because there was a possibility that Coleman's
debt would lead to possession of his stock by pro-German inter-
ests, and that rumors circulating to that effect were already threat-
ening to result in the loss of orders and profits for the company 328
The court also appears to have been impressed that Pierre,
through participation in the holding company, used Coleman's
stock to reward some of the junior officers at Du Pont, men whom
the company wanted to encourage because of their great productiv-
ity 3 2 Finally, it is probable that the court of appeals may have
been influenced by T Coleman Du Pont's letter to the Du Pont
directors and stockholders, written on May 11, 1917, shortly after
Judge Thompson ordered a stockholder meeting. In the letter,
Coleman claimed that Pierre fully apprised him of the attitude of
the finance committee, that the statements of the plaintiffs' attor-
ney to the contrary were "entirely unwarranted and are untrue m
every particular," that he never intended to offer more stock to the
company than he did in his original rejected offer, and that "the
stockholders should know directly from [him] that [he believed]
that they have no right or interest whatever in the stock which
[he] formerly owned." 8 0
Hodgman v Atlantic Refining Co.
In addition to modifying Judge Thompson's decision in Du
Pont, the Third Circuit reversed Judge Morris's opinion in Hodg-
man.3"' The Third Circuit's reversal of the district court in Hodg-
man bears a strong resemblance to its reversal of the district court
327. This testimony was printed in the N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1917, § 1, at 1O, cols. 4-8.
328. Du Pont v. Du Pont, 256 F at 162, 167-69.
329. See text accompanying notes 124-125 & 136 supra.
330. See note 327 supra. Given the circumstances of the company, it seems understanda-
ble, and probably desirable, that the Third Circuit enlarged the ambit of corporate manage-
rial autonomy to legitimize Pierre's actions.
331. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d 781 (3d Cir. 1926), rev'g 300 F 590 (D. Del.
1924), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 731 (1926).
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in Du Pont because both appellate opinions demonstrate a willing-
ness to create great discretion for management and reveal less of
an inclination to find fraudulent conduct on the part of managers.
In Hodgman, in another opinion written by Judge Buffington,
the appellate court declared that it had the benefit of an "enlight-
ening and authoritative 3 3 2 Delaware chancery court decision333
which was decided after the district court's opinion was written.
The appellate court cited the case for the proposition that when
"fairness in light of all the circumstances" dictated that stock
should be sold to different persons at different prices, and when
such a differential sale was done in the "genuine and beneficial in-
terest of the corporation," no transactions need be set aside.33" Re-
lying on the above reasoning, the court of appeals declared that the
deal struck between Superior and Atlantic should not be set aside
for fraud.3
Even if the Third Circuit relied on authority unavailable to Mor-
ris, it is clear that Buffington's analysis concentrated on aspects of
the transaction which were of minimal importance to Judge Mor-
ris, and minimized those aspects which had disturbed Morris most.
For example, Morris appears to have believed that the roughly
contemporaneous ten-year purchase contract Atlantic had made
with Superior should not have been treated as an element of the
stock deal. Morris had observed that, although Atlantic was obli-
gated to buy all of Superior's oil, Atlantic was to buy at market
prices, and "[t]he Superior product was of a desirable quality, and
usually sold readily at a premium above posted prices."3 36 Further,
trial testimony showed that "[t]he overbearing element" of Atlan-
tic's decision in making the ten-year arrangement was the refining
company's "desire to assure for our refineries for a long period of
tine the appreciable and staple quantity of crude oil" which Supe-
rior could supply 7 In contrast, the court of appeals declared that
the ten-year deal became effective at a time when "oil was at low
332. Id. at 788.
333. Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, 132 A. 442 (1926).
334. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d at 788 (quoting Bodell v. General Gas & Elec.
Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 119, _, 132 A. 442, 448 (1926)).
335. See td. at 793-94.
336. Hodgman v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 300 F at 595.
337. Id. at 595.
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figures and a drug on the market," so that Atlantic simply was not
benefiting from the ten-year obligation.33 8 The court emphasized
that, despite any misleading information regarding the price paid
by Atlantic for Superior stock, the underwriters would not have
entered into their stock purchase without the ten-year guaranteed
acquisition of Superior's output by Atlantic; the court then con-
cluded that Superior would not have received the $16 per share it
did from the underwriting deal without the sale to Atlantic at the
lower price 3  The court of appeals reasoned that Superior clearly
benefited from the sale even at the lower prices4° because Superior
badly needed the operating capital it received from the underwrit-
ing.3 41 Further, the court observed, the underwriting venture would
have been impossible unless Atlantic released Superior from its ob-
ligations under the original $2.75 million loan from Atlantic to Su-
perior because the loan contained a condition that no further issu-
ance of stock was permitted until the loan was paid.34 2 This fact
also appears to have been of little importance to Morris.
Similarly of little importance to Morris, but of great moment to
the Third Circuit, was that Atlantic obligated itself not to sell any
of the shares it received for two years. Buffington commented that
this obligation meant that Atlantic benefited Superior
by changing its position of creditor with assured periodic inter-
est payments for that of stockholder with uncertain dividends;
by tying up its stock for 2 years as that stock which others, dur-
ing the tie-up period, sold for $16, and indeed as high as $20.75
had only a value of some $6 when the tie-up expired. s'3
Atlantic hardly had profited from this arrangement. Instead, Buff-
ington suggested, Superior benefited, and the entire transaction
was within the Superior corporation's "zone of discretion 44 and
therefore could not be challenged by a dissident stockholder. In-
deed, "there was equal, if not stronger, ground for stockholders of
338. Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Hodgman, 13 F.2d at 794.
339. Id.
340. See id. Bankers were paying $16 per share for Superior stock; Atlantic purchased the
stock for $8 per share. Id. at 789.
341. Id. at 788.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 794.
344. Id. at 788.
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Atlantic criticizing their company's management for entering into
these contracts than for Superior's blaming their management." 4"
Still, Buffington appears to have sought to have minimized the
likelihood of success of any suit by Atlantic shareholders, as he
then proceeded, in effect, to overrule Morris's findings of fact and
held that, even though Superior's President Carts might have com-
mitted fraud, Catts's fraudulent acts "were m no way connected
with, participated in, or even known to, Atlantic. ' 8-4 Buffington ac-
knowledged that Atlantic's officers had followed Catts's instruc-
tions not to reveal to the underwriters the price at which Atlantic
was buying Superior's stock, even though Atlantic's officers knew
Catts was telling the underwriters that Atlantic was paying $16 per
share. Buffington observed, however, that the underwriters were
not harmed because they did eventually learn the price Atlantic
was paying.3' 7 Perhaps more troublesome to the court of appeals
was that Henry, Atlantic's officer, had sat quietly at Superior's
board of directors meeting as Catts made incorrect statements
about the price that Atlantic would pay for Superior's stock.3 8
This part of the appellate opinion appears to come very close to,
if it does not pass the point of, condoning actual fraud on the part
of Henry First, the court declared that Henry denied the fact that
he was present when misrepresentations were made as to the price
Atlantic was paying and that others' testimony supported
Henry.3 49 Perhaps ultimately refusing to reverse Judge Morris's
finding of fact to the contrary, however, Buffington attempted to
excuse Henry's conduct by ruling that:
[A]ssuming for present purposes such statements were made,
and that Henry, who knew that Atlantic was only paying $8, re-
mained silent, such silence is not necessarily fraudulent in pur-
pose, for Henry might well have assumed that, as Superior had
mtrusted the financing plant [sic] to Catts, its president, as
Catts was its sole representative in dealing with the bankers and
Atlantic, and as Catts had requested Atlantic not to disclose its
price, we may as well attribute Henry's silence to his feeling he
345. Id.
346. Id. at 789.
347. See id. at 790-91.
348. See id. at 793.
349. Id.
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was complying with Superior's wishes, expressed by its presi-
dent, about a sale at different prices, which was lawful, as to
evidence a purpose to mislead and defraud. 50
This ruling means, then, that the Third Circuit, per Buffington,
did not necessarily view intentional misleading of other directors
or stockholders as fraud, because the misleading might be consis-
tent with the overall business purposes of the corporation. Clearly,
Morris reached an opposite conclusion. Morris contended that,
where there was intentional misleading in circumstances such as
those of Hodgman, where the party engaging in the misrepresenta-
tions derives financial benefits, the strict standards of fiduciary
conduct which Morris believed ought to apply to a corporate officer
required that such misrepresentations be found to be fraud. 51 As
did its opinion in Du Pont, the Third Circuit's opinion in Hodg-
man loosened fiduciary standards and facilitated the concentration
of corporate power in management.
Managers' Securities Co. v Mallery
In 1935, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit, continuing the trend evident in its Du Pont and Hodgman
opinions, reversed John Nields's decision in Mallery.5 2 In an opin-
ion written by Judge J. Warren Davis, the Third Circuit held that
the J.P Morgan debt had to be borne by the company as a whole,
rather than by one class of stockholders,353 because "money earned
by a corporation does not become the property of its stockholders
until it is distributed to them as dividends or in dissolution."3"
Even though the "5 after 7" income was credited to a separate
class A account, Davis wrote, "until it was distributed in dividends
or in retiring stock, it remained an asset of the corporation."355
The inescapable corollary that followed from this assertion was
that any debt procured through the use of the "5 after 7" income
350. Id. at 793-94.
351. See text accompanying notes 257-260 supra.
352. Managers' Sec. Co. v. Mallery, 77 F.2d 186 (3d Cir. 1935), rev'g 1 F Supp. 942 (D.
Del. 1932), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 593 (1935); see text accompanying notes 267-289 supra.
353. See text accompanying notes 287-289 supra.
354. 77 F.2d at 190.
355. Id.
[Vol. 23:725
MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
had to be borne by the corporation, and not by a single class of
stockholders. 56
Davis's opinion arrived at this conclusion after first declaring
that Managers' 1928 purchase of GM stock violated its charter; 5 7
consequently, the loss arising from the violation had to be borne
by the entire corporation, rather than the class A stockholders, be-
cause all corporate members had to take responsibility for the cor-
poration's illegal act. 58 Judge Davis noted that the charter had
provided that the "5 after 7" income was to be used only for retir-
ing class A shares and for paying dividends to class A stockholders.
He then reasoned that Managers' had "improperly used the earn-
ings to purchase that stock, and the class A stockholders, as such,
may not be held liable for the defendant's illegal acts which di-
rectly injured them more than it did any one else." 5 9 The court
thus used Managers' charter to enforce the imposition of the J.P
Morgan debt onto the entire company even though only the class A
stockholders had stood to gain from the 1928 mvestment.360 The
court's opinion was not without some logic and authority insofar as
the opinion rested on the proposition that all stockholders should
have borne the responsibility for an ultra vires action.361 Nonethe-
less, the proceeding was one in equity, and it would seem that the
district court's Judge Nields possessed equitable discretion to de-
cide that the class A shareholders should have been made to bear
the loss because they would have stood to gain the most.
It appears, then, that Mallery further illustrates divergent ap-
proaches to corporate law pursued by the district court and the
court of appeals. Whereas Nields in Mallery (and Thompson in Du
Pont, and Morris in Hodgman) sought to "legitimize" corporate
autonomy by checking a majority's or a manager's abuse of power,
Davis's opinion for the Third Circuit in Mallery lent support to a
corporation's discretionary use of power by a somewhat strained
interpretation of Managers' charter. The company's charter did
not explicitly proscribe the use of "5 after 7" income for purchas-
356. See id. at 192.
357. Id.
358. See id.
359. Id. at 191.
360. See id. at 190, 192.
361. Id. at 192.
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Ing additional stock, but merely stipulated two uses to which the
income would be put-the retirement of debts and the payment of
dividends. 62 The reinvestment plan, after all, was a deferred
scheme for the payment of dividends, and if one wished to con-
strue the charter liberally, the reinvestment plan would seem
clearly permissible. As was true in these other appeals, Davis's
strict interpretation of the charter seems only to have occurred be-
cause of a desire not to restrict the discretion of the majority
shareholders or the managers.
CONCLUSION
In the first half of this century the American public was both
attracted and repelled by corporations. Although many persons in
government and business perceived large corporations and eco-
nomic concentration as necessary concomitants to a mass produc-
tion economy, public spokesmen decried what they believed to be
an alarming accumulation of social and economic power. Ameri-
cans wanted the goods produced by the highly industrialized econ-
omy of the twentieth century, but, as Justice Brandeis observed in
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee,363 there was a continued, pervading
suspicion "that by the control which the few have exerted through
giant corporations, individual initiative and effort are being para-
lyzed, creative power impaired and human happiness lessened."36'
Although there were attempts at regulation, as well as "devil"
theories of the corporation and popular fears of its Leviathan-like
power, the public and the government's attitude toward corpora-
tions from the 1890's to the 1930's is best characterized as one of
Janus-faced ambivalence. Government officials and public spokes-
men knew, and sometimes maintained, that corporations facili-
tated increased productivity which brought mass-produced con-
sumer goods to the public, and some advocated corporate
managerial autonomy so that productivity might continue.6 5 De-
362. Id. at 189; see id. at 192.
363. 288 U.S. 517 (1933).
364. Id. at 565 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
365. At the beginning of this century, according to J. Willard Hurst, "we treated the cor-
porate instrument as so useful for desired economic growth as to warrant using law to make
it available on terms most responsive to businessmen's needs or wishes." J. HURST, supra
note 18, at 62.
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spite these opinions, or perhaps as an inescapable corollary, many
of these same persons characterized the corporation as a bloodless
money-making monster, a menace to the common man, that not
only would take away his livelihood but also would corrupt his re-
public.366 In short, "the use Americans have made of the corporate
device [was] strangely at odds with this historic mistrust of corpo-
rations and 'Big Business.' "s367
The federal judges in Delaware had contradictory and somewhat
irreconcilable responsibilities. First, they were required to ensure
that the rights of all stockholders were protected against corporate
abuse of power.368 The courts seemingly concluded that the protec-
tion of a stockholder's rights, especially his right to govern corpo-
rate policy by voting his stock, would best confer legitimacy on the
corporate autonomy that was newly-created by permissive legisla-
tive frameworks.36 9 Only by maintaining some semblance of "dem-
ocratic" shareholder control could the courts allay the "vague and
indescribable dread and suspicion" 370 of corporate plutocracy that
gnawed at the public psyche.
The Delaware federal judges also may have realized that their
review of corporate decisionmaking, in an exercise to protect stock-
holder rights, not only would encourage general public acceptance
of corporations, but also might make stockholders less fearful of
corporate relocation in Delaware, thereby generating more state
revenues. When stockholders perceived that there was a judicial, if
not a legislative, check against the infringement of their rights in
Delaware, they would be more willing to vote in favor of relocation
so as to enjoy the advantages of corporate autonomy while avoid-
ing the dangers. Moreover, the federal judges' regulation of corpo-
rate activities most likely enhanced the growth of corporate auton-
omy because growth ultimately depended on public and
366. See, e.g., Grover Cleveland's Address to Congress, 1896, quoted in A. THIMM, Busi-
NESS IDEOLOGIES IN THE REFORM-PRoGRESSivE ERA: 1880-1914, at 56 (1976).
367. H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN'S CONsTrruTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT, THE "CONSPIRACY THEORY", AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 372 (1968).
368. The Delaware federal district judges believed that part of their judicial task was to
ensure that stockholders were not exploited by corrupt managers or crafty "robber barons."
A. CONRAD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIvE 30 (1976).
369. J. HURST, supra note 13, at 93.
370. W COOK, THE CORPORATION PROBLEM 253 (1893).
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stockholder support, which could be better obtained if the exercise
of managerial power could be "legitimized."
In addition, the federal judges had a second responsibility-to
guard against being so zealous to protect shareholder democracy
that they might endanger managerial autonomy and thus discour-
age incorporation. Perhaps sensing this responsibility, the judges
generally refused to intervene in corporate activities when inter-
vention would have interfered substantially with the corporations'
abilities to make business decisions.
The Delaware district court reflected public ambivalence toward
corporations by attempting to strike a balance between corporate
"legitimacy" and managerial autonomy In their decisions, Judges
Bradford, Thompson, Morris, and Nields sought to "legitimize"
managerial autonomy, largely created by the Delaware legislature,
by maintaining mechanisms of democratic control over corporate
decisionmaking and by preventing managers from egregiously
abusing corporate power. At the same time, the judges exercised
self-restraint to preserve managerial autonomy by limiting their In-
terventionary activities to those instances of clear abuse of power,
such as deception, discrimination against minority stockholders, or
violation of charter provisions.
This judicial self-restraint, in combination with the broad oppor-
tunities that the Delaware legislature gave corporations, facilitated
the concentration of economic power in corporate management.
With the sharp reduction in the demands that legal and govern-
mental institutions imposed on corporations, the corporations were
left relatively free to respond to economic necessities. These eco-
nomic necessities gave rise to what Alfred 0. Chandler has called
the "managerial revolution":
Technological innovation, the rapid growth and spread of popu-
lation, and expanding per capita income made the processes of
production and distribution more complex and increased the
speed and volume of the flow of materials through them. Ex-
istmg market mechanisms were often no longer able to coordi-
nate these flows effectively. The new technologies and expanding
markets thus created for the first time a need for administrative
coordination. To carry out this function enterpreneurs built
multiunit business enterprises and hired the managers needed to
administer them. As technology became both more complex
and more productive, and as markets continued to expand, these
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managers assumed command in the central sectors of the Ameri-
can economy.371
Delaware district court judges expanded and legitimized mana-
gerial autonomy, and thereby helped to ensure that the level of
legal restraints on corporations remained low enough to allow man-
agers to ascend in the corporate power structure, as they did, for
example, in Delaware's premier industry, the Du Pont corpora-
tion.1 2 With the concentration of corporate power in management,
the managers could make production and distribution decisions
without significant fear of stockholder interference through judicial
machinery Until about 1937, as long as the managers remained
within the limits that the district court judges established to "le-
gitimize" corporate and managerial autonomy, the managers were
free to operate their enterprises as they saw fit, notwithstanding
individual or group stockholders' objections.37 3
The Third Circuit's court of appeals went even further than did
the district court in facilitating the concentration of power m man-
agement and, particularly in Judge Buffington's Du Pont and
Hodgman opinions, 74 appeared to disregard some of the district
court's "legitimizing" legal restraints on managerial and corporate
power. It is not now possible to determine conclusively what
caused the judges of the Third Circuit's court of appeals to depart
from the balanced approach of the district court judges. There are
suggestions in the biographical details which can be discovered re-
garding Circuit Judge Buffington, however, that the court of ap-
peals judges simply might have placed more faith in the benefits to
be derived from managerial autonomy than did the district court
judges. It will be remembered that District Judge Bradford tem-
371. A. CHANDLER, supra note 5, at 484.
372. See generally text accompanying notes 114-191 supra.
373. Although the professional and familial ties of the Delaware district judges suggest
that they would be amenable to corporate interests, the district court decisions do not ap-
pear to reflect great bias either for or against corporate autonomy. In fact, the district court
often was sympathetic to proponents of fiduciary responsibility. For example, Judge John P
Nields's professional ties would have led some persons to expect that he would support the
management in Mallery, who argued in favor of spreading the debt to the minority share-
holders. Nields instead held in favor of the minority shareholders. Curiously, the willingness
to promote fiduciary responsibility appears to have transcended political party loyalties, be-
ing as strong in the Republicans, Bradford and Nields, as m the Democrat, Morris.
374. See text accompanying notes 318-351 supra.
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pered any reverence for corporations with the moral fire of
Savanarola, 75 that District Judge Morris may have been concerned
about the arrogance of corporate plutocrats such as Pierre S. Du
Pont, 76 and that District Judge Nields, while he may have revered
Pierre Du Pont, shared Morris's reservations about what "vast cor-
porate wealth and influence" might do if left unregulated.8 "7 These
cautious attitudes, these doubts about what corporations or the
wealthy might do if not subject to check, do not appear to have
troubled Circuit Judge Buffington.
Judge Joseph Buffington was a fascinating figure. Well known
before and during the First World War for his speeches to the Eu-
ropean immigrants to Pennsylvania, Buffington seems to have rel-
ished his duty to lecture the foreign-born on the duties of Ameri-
can citizenship. Most often in Buffington's statements these duties
included sobriety, obedience to the law, and acceptance of existing
American social and economic conditions. In 1919, Buflington told
a group of new American citizens that "the man who is always
kicking about the Government is a domestic enemy, and you
should avoid him." 8 8 At this tine he made aliens going through
the naturalization process recite a special oath which he had com-
posed that they were neither anarchists nor polygamists.37 He ap-
pears also to have been particularly wary of "Bolshevism. '"380 For
Buffington there was no need for social reform. "Law and order
and love of country sum up our needs,"3 81 he stated in 1919. As a
proponent of law and order Buffington was nearly unmatched. He
called for stern, unflinching, and vigorous suppression of mob
rule,3 82 and he recommended the whipping post for repeat offend-
ers because "[a] professional criminal who is punished by such an
institution as the whipping post is not only punished in his own
375. See text accompanying notes 38-40 supra.
376. See text accompanying notes 43-45 supra.
377. See text accompanying notes 46-53 supra.
378. N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1919, § 1, at 2, col. 5; see id. Oct. 28, 1919, § 1, at 1.
379. Buffington's oath: "I am not a disbeliever in or opposed to organized Government or
a member of or affiliated with any organzation or body of persons teaching disbelief in or
opposed to organized Government. I am not a polygamist, nor a believer in the practice of
polygamy " Id. Oct. 1, 1919, § 1, at 2, col. 5.
380. Id. Jan. 11, 1919.
381. Id. Nov. 2, 1919, § 1, at 22, col. 1.
382. Id. June 13, 1920, § 8, at 8, col. 4.
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eyes but loses caste with his fellow-criminals. s" 3 In 1933, with the
close of Prohibition and the advent of the bank "holiday," Buffing-
ton told the immigrants, "Don't be like some of the younger gener-
ation who think it smart to drink a cocktail"; and "Don't be fright-
ened by what has happened in recent days about banks. There are
many, many honest banks and bankers who will take care of your
money "384
Judge Buffington, as a good Republican, as a good Episcopalian,
and as a man prominent in Philadelphia social circles, in short, as
a proper bourgeois, appears to have believed that it would be best
for the country to have a relatively submissive working class and
orderly development of the American economic system.38 5 In an
opinion in which he declined to hold that the activities of United
States Steel violated the Sherman Act, Buffington had made clear
his concurrence in the views that "[sluccess and magnitude of bus-
iness, the rewards of fair and honorable endeavor, were not among
the evils which threatened the public welfare and attracted the at-
tention of Congress." He appeared to agree with the characteriza-
tion of a government witness who commented on the "magnifi-
cent" and "wonderful" organization which resulted in
specialization of the managers of the international operations of
United States Steel; he noted approvingly the domestic benefits to
be gained by the foreign operations of the company; and he con-
cluded that the United States Steel company's success was not due
to a conspiracy in restraint of trade but rather from the company's
inspired integration of operations and "economy of manage-
ment. 3 8 6 Perhaps Buffington's decision in the Du Pont case38 7 also
illustrates a sympathy for managerial interests and his faith that
383. Id. Apr. 6, 1928, at 10, col. 2. When not advocating use of the whipping post, Buffing-
ton used moral suasion as a crime prevention device. In 1926, while sentencing a young
criminal, Buffington told the offender: "Don't think you are smart in trying to outwit the
law. Crime doesn't pay; in fact, it is the most stupid thing imaginable." Id. Mar. 13, 1926, at
4, col. 5.
384. Id. Mar. 23, 1933, at 2.
385. When advocating the use of the wlhppmg post, for example, the New York Times
reported that Judge Buffington "was not so much interested m causes back of crime waves
as in methods that will check them." Id. Apr. 6, 1928, at 10, col. 2.
386. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 223 F 55, 67, 96, 110-11, 133 (D.N.J.
1915).
387. See text accompanying notes 317-330 supra.
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economic affairs safely could be entrusted to corporate managers.
The different interpretations of the facts and law of the district
court and the court of appeals in respect to an officer's fiduciary
duty to the corporation might thus have arisen from the judges'
divergent attitudes toward the concentration of corporate power in
managers.
Whatever the explanation for the court of appeals' inclination to
uphold managerial discretion, 88 the Third Circuit court of appeals'
actions tipped the balance between managerial autonomy and cor-
porate democracy in favor of managerial autonomy The jurispru-
dential activity of the Third Circuit's court of appeals' judges thus
further facilitated the concentration of economic power in corpo-
rate managers, who soon came to determine the allocation of goods
and services in the national economy "I" The Third Circuit's court
of appeals may have been so concerned with maximizing manage-
rial autonomy that the district court's attempts to regulate and le-
gitimize corporations were seriously undermined. Still, the max-
imization of managerial autonomy beyond the limits prescribed by
388. Another, and an extraordinarily intriguing explanation for the divergent philosophies
between the district and circuit courts is that, in less than a year after the circuit court
decided Mallery, it became clear that Judge Davis was a "malign influence" on the court.
See Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 533 (3d Cir. 1948). For example,
in 1937 and 1938, although Judge Buffington was in his eighties, nearly blind and deaf, and
fiercely adamant in his refusal to hire a clerk, opinions bearing his name routinely issued
from the court of appeals. Id., N.Y. Times, May 24, 1941, § 1, at 18, col. 1. It subsequently
was revealed that Judge Davis wrote some of these opinions and attached the senior judge's
name to them. In five of those opinions, Davis apparently decided in favor of former movie
mogul William Fox because of "loans" from Fox totalling $27,500. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 23,
1941, § 1, at 15. See generally Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514.
Davis's apparent corruption was not restricted to the Fox cases. In 1944, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit had to re-open two patent cases decided by Davis because
they were "tainted" with fraud. See Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d at
535. See also N.Y. Times, June 20, 1944, § 1, at 23, col. 7. The winning party in those cases,
Universal Oil Products Corporation, apparently had earned Davis's favor because Univer-
sal's counsel made a $10,000 "loan" to Davis's cousin, which was to be "repaid" to Davis.
There is no indication, however, that the Managers' Company in Mallery, see text accompa-
nying notes 352-362 supra, exercised any influence on the court of appeals. Nonetheless, in
Mallery, it appears that Judge Davis rendered a decision enabling one party, the class A
majority stockholders, to take undue advantage of another party, the class B minority
stockholders.
389. See A. CHANDLER, supra note 5, for the authoritative description of how corporate
managers, through vertical and horizontal integration of entire industries, came to deter-
mine the allocation of manufactured goods in the national economy.
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the Delaware district court may not necessarily have been detri-
mental to the public or to the minority shareholders, at least inso-
far as all benefited from a climate in which returns on investment
were maximized. 90
With the stock market crash of 1929, and the ensuing Great De-
pression, however, Americans' faith in the benefits to be gained by
autonomy of industrial concerns was severely shaken. In particular,
the economic chaos which ensued led many Americans to question
whether the market in corporate securities could be allowed to
continue with so little federal regulation. The result of this eco-
nomic chaos was the passage of the Securities Act of 1933, the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934, and the creation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission. Actions that the Third Circuit's court
of appeals had approved of, such as selling shares under less than
full disclosure in Hodgman,'91 came to be seen as an evil in need of
immediate eradication when millions lost their savings as the spec-
ulative fever of the twenties ended disasterously. The economic
disaster appears to have resulted in both personal tragedy and doc-
trinal change in the Third Circuit. The Depression left court of
appeals Judge J. Warren Davis badly in debt. 92 Davis had specu-
lated lavishly m the stock market, perhaps as a result of a simple
faith he, like Buffington, placed in the competence of American
corporate industry. Davis's indebtedness to his brokers initiated
the events that resulted in a major judicial scandal, in charges that
Davis's financial weakness had led to corruption, and, finally, in his
own court's declaring that Davis had allowed himself to be bought
by litigants. 3
Following the "Constitutional Revolution" of 1937, the Supreme
Court appeared to alter its former insistence on the primacy of
"freedom of contract" and the autonomy of industrial capital-
ists.3 94 In a related development some Third Circuit district and
court of appeals judges, perhaps reacting to perceived excesses in
favor of managerial autonomy established earlier by the court of
390. Cf. R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978).
391. See text accompanying notes 331-350 supra.
392. Root Ref. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 169 F.2d 514, 530 (3d Cir. 1948).
393. Id. at 531.
394. See generally S. PREssER & J. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND AMERICAN ISTORY. CAsEs AND
MATERIALS 674-705 (1980).
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appeals,"'5 and perhaps in some type of expiation for the perceived
corruption of Judge Davis, 96 began to issue opinions which sought
to alter the doctrines regulating issuance of corporate securities
and corporate governance. These alterations emphasized the re-
sponsibilities of issuers for full disclosure and expanded the opera-
tion of "corporate democracy." In short, these post-1937 opinions
sought to tip back the balance, and ensure a greater degree of cir-
cumscription of managerial autonomy and an enhanced opportu-
nity for stockholder participation in corporate governance.
These personal and doctrinal developments in the federal courts
of the Third Circuit, as well as the reactions which have recently
resulted and which continue to effect corporate law doctrines, are
the subjects of a final article on the history of the Third Circuit
courts, to be published in the near future.
395. See text accompanying notes 316-362 supra.
396. See note 388 supra.
397. See, e.g., Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956); Zahn v. Tran-
samerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d
Cir. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
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